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Private sector investment has become one of the most essential sources of international 
capital flows to developing countries. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as one type of 
private sector investment has the potential to drive economic growth and development. 
Understanding the factors that motivate or deter foreign investors from investing in a 
developing country therefore is crucial. This thesis examines the particular case of 
Pakistan and analyzes internal and external factors that have affected the inclines and 
declines in inflows of FDI to the country between 2000 and 2014. By performing a 
comparative sectoral analysis, this thesis examines the effects of government efficacy, 
national security, and global levels of FDI inflows on FDI inflows on three distinct 
sectors in Pakistan: Energy, Telecommunications, and Financial Services. The thesis 
argues that a rapidly deteriorating domestic situation post-2008 due to weakened 
governance and limited security provision within the country has increased the perceived 
levels of risk and uncertainty associated with investing in Pakistan. This has resulted in a 
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 The field of international development has evolved significantly since World War 
II, when it first emerged as a formal area of study. Priorities within the international 
development agenda have shifted from stimulating economic growth to identifying ways 
of enhancing standards of living. The United Nations’ Post-2015 Development Agenda is 
a culmination of the shifts that have occurred over the last seven decades, and relies upon 
the ability of a diverse range of actors and stakeholders to participate in what has been 
termed, a “global partnership.”1 As it becomes critical to look beyond aid and integrate 
all forms of international initiatives capable of affecting development results, the role of 
the private sector is particularly important.2 James Michel, Senior Advisor at the Center 
for Strategic International Studies argues that, “to the extent that private investment 
creates jobs and helps lift people out of poverty and into the formal economy, there can 
be a virtuous cycle of growing markets, increased investment, and expanded wellbeing.”3 
 Over the last decade private sector investment has become one of the most 
important sources of international capital flows to developing countries.4 A critical 
component of private sector financing, the growth of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
                                                
1 Michel, James. 2016. Beyond Aid: The Integration of Sustainable Development in a Coherent International Agenda. 
Center for Strategic and International Studies. P. iv, 1. Accessed February 2016. 
http://csis.org/files/publication/160111_Michel_BeyondAid_Web.pdf 
2 Ibid, p. iv 
3 Ibid, p. vii 
4 Ibid, p. 31 
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inflows to developing countries provides evidence of the private sector’s increased 
capacity to contribute to the development agenda. The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development defines Foreign Direct Investment as: 
“a category of cross-border investment in which an investor resident in 
one economy establishes a lasting interest in and a significant degree of 
influence over an enterprise resident in another economy.”5  
 
Ownership of 10% or more of the voting power in an enterprise in one economy by an 
investor in another economy is evidence of such a relationship. 
Unlike international aid, higher levels of FDI suggest greater investor confidence 
in the economic strength of a country, as well as in the capacity of investments to accrue 
competitive rates of return while accounting for risk and uncertainty. Governments of 
developing countries have come to rely on FDI as a critical source of external finance due 
to its ability to assist in human capital formation and create a pool of resources that 
allows for socio-economic advancement. Combined with sound macroeconomic policies, 
and greater openness to trade, FDI can provide developing countries with increased 
access to capital, technology transfers, and market competition, thereby contributing to 
and driving levels of economic growth. 
Given that foreign direct investment has the potential to promote a country’s 
economic growth, it is critical for us to understand the factors that motivate or deter 
foreign investors from investing in a given developing country. This thesis explores the 
particular case of Pakistan, and analyzes internal and external factors affecting FDI 
inflows to the country between 2000 and 2014. The time period chosen in this study 
encapsulates the sharpest incline and decline of FDI inflows within Pakistan. 
                                                
5 OECD Data: Foreign Direct Investment. Accessed January 2015. https://data.oecd.org/fdi/fdi-flows.htm 
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Like its regional and economic counterparts, Pakistan experienced a substantial 
increase in FDI inflows between 2000 and 2007. This trend suddenly ceased and then 
reversed following the global financial crash of 2008, when most regional developing 
countries experienced sharp declines in inflows of FDI. However, while nearly all of 
Pakistan’s regional and economic counterparts were able to recover—or at least 
stabilize—rates of growth in FDI by 2009, FDI inflows to Pakistan dropped consistently 
until 2013, the first year that a modest rate of growth was recorded since 2007. 
This dynamic presents an interesting puzzle, making Pakistan an exceptional and 
important case to study. Pakistani economists such as Muhammad Arshad Khan and 
Nayyra Zeb have attributed lower levels of FDI inflows to Pakistan on limited political 
stability, inadequate infrastructure, corruption, and poor levels of security.6 Investment 
banks such as Santander’s and KMPG have echoed these concerns alongside issues that 
include arbitrary administration of laws and regulations and non-respect of intellectual 
property rights.7 Each of the factors is reflective of the Pakistani government’s limited 
capacity to offer an attractive investment climate to foreign investors. 
To understand and explain the Pakistani experience, this study analyzes the 
effects of internal and external shifts that have influenced Pakistan’s capacity to attract 
inflows of FDI. In particular, this paper examines the effects of government efficacy, 
national security, and global investment trends, on domestic FDI inflows to Pakistan 
between 2000 and 2014. Government effectiveness, as measured by the World 
                                                
6 Arshad Khan, Muhammad and Ali Khan, Shujaat. Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in Pakistan: A 
Sectoral Analysis. Pakistan Institute of Development Economics. 2011. Accessed October 2015. 
http://pide.org.pk/pdr/index.php/wp/article/viewFile/2968/2917 
Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in Pakistan: A Sectoral Analysis; Zeb, Nayyra et al. Role of Foreign 
Direct Investment in Economic Growth of Pakistan. International Journal of Economics and Finance 6, no. 1 (2014): 32 
– 38.  
7 Santander Trade Portal. Pakistan: Foreign Investment. Accessed September 2015. 
https://en.santandertrade.com/establish-overseas/pakistan/investing 
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Governance Indicators, captures the quality of civil service institutions, policy 
formulation and policy implementation.8 National security, as measured by the Global 
Terrorism Index, encapsulates the frequency of intentional acts of violence or threats of 
violence by non-state actors.9 Global investment trends, as calculated by the United 
Nation’s Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Report, 
represents the total amount of global FDI inflows in any given year. Each of these factors 
reflects the extent to which Pakistan has been able to provide an investment climate that 
is attractive foreign investors. 
This paper argues that the instatement of a fragile democratic government and 
rapidly deteriorating domestic security situation increased the perceived levels of risk and 
uncertainty associated with the investment climate in Pakistan. The implications of 
worsening internal conditions in Pakistan on investment returns were more thoroughly 
considered by foreign investors at this time due to the weakened international financial 
climate that had reduced total global investment levels. The simultaneous deterioration in 
internal and external conditions rendered Pakistan as a riskier investment destination, 
resulting in a decline in FDI inflows that was sharper and protracted.  
Recognizing that the effects of a decline in FDI was not felt equally across the 
Pakistani economy, this paper undertakes a comparative sectoral analysis of FDI inflows 
within Pakistan, analyzing the ways in which government effectiveness, security, and 
global investment levels have affected Pakistan’s FDI inflows nationally and across 
sectors. The sectors analyzed in this study are Energy, Telecommunications, and 
                                                
8 World Governance Indicators 2015. Accessed December 2016. 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc  
9 Global Terrorism Index. 2015. Accessed January 2016. http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf	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Financial Services. By examining the effects of the three selected explanatory variables 
on each of the three sectors, this paper discusses the conditions limiting the provision of 
an environment that promotes the inflow of FDI to Pakistan. Analyzing differences in the 
relationships between each of the aforementioned independent variables and inflows of 
FDI across sectors, this paper concludes by discussing ways the Pakistani government 
can then intervene on a national and sectoral level to create an environment that is 
conducive to foreign investment. 
 
1.1 Changing Trends in Foreign Direct Investment: Emerging Markets 
and Pakistan 
 
FDI inflows to developing economies have been growing significantly since the early 
2000s. Faltering briefly in 2009, FDI inflows to developing economies increased to US$ 
681.4 billion in 2014, representing a share of 54% of global FDI inflows.10 This growth 
emerges at a time when FDI inflows to the developed world have been declining, 
highlighting a recognition of growth opportunities existent within the developing world. 
                                                
10 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. World Investment Report 2015. Accessed January 2016. 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf 
Figure 1a: FDI Inflows Across Continents, 2000 – 
2014 
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2015, 
Data Compiled by Author 
Figure 1b: FDI Inflows across Asia, 2000 – 2014 
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2015, 
Data Compiled by Author 
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As observed in Figure 1a, Asia has received increasing attention as a lucrative 
destination for FDI inflows within the developing world. Since the early 1990’s, several 
Asian emerging market economies have worked towards reforming and liberalizing their 
trade regimes, opening their markets to foreign investment. However, the impact of trade 
liberalization on FDI inflows within Asian economies has varied across countries. Figure 
1b indicates that FDI inflows to East Asia have remained the highest between 2000 and 
2014, followed by South East Asia. Inflows of FDI to West Asia have been in decline 
since 2008. FDI inflows to South Asia increased steadily until 2008, after which they 
have been unable to record significant rates of growth. However, the slight upward trend 
in FDI inflows to South Asia observed in 2013 hints at the possibility of growing foreign 
investor interest in the region.  
Asian economies listed on the MSCI Emerging Market Index in 2002 maintained 
fairly similar rates of growth in FDI inflows until the global financial crash of 2008. 11 
Following the crash, emerging markets listed on the MSCI Emerging Market Index 
experienced a sharp decline in FDI inflows. All but Pakistan, however, were able to 
recover growth in FDI inflows within the next three years. The inability of Pakistan’s 
economy to perform at a rate similar to other Asian emerging markets within the 
international economy resulted in its demotion from Emerging Market status to Frontier 
Market status in 2012. Pakistan was the only Emerging Asian Market to be demoted in 
the 2012 rankings. Given that all emerging Asian economies barring Pakistan were able 
to recover from the external shock of the financial crash in 2008 suggests that external 
                                                
11 The MSCI Emerging Markets Index is an index created by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) designed to 
measure equity market performance in global emerging markets.  
Emerging markets refer to developing countries that are experiencing rapid growth and industrialization. Frontier 
markets refer to nations that are at an earlier stage of economic development as compared to emerging markets. 
Asian Emerging Markets in 2002 were China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand 
and Taiwan. Sri Lanka was demoted to a frontier market in the index’s 2007 ranking. 
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limitations were not the sole reason for Pakistan’s inability to regain growth in FDI 
inflows. Rather, internal changes specific to Pakistan were preventing a full recovery in 
growth rates of FDI inflows to the country. Examining trends in FDI inflows across three 
sectors—energy, telecommunications and financial services—this paper argues that 
security and governance deficits have rendered Pakistan a risky investment destination, 
and dampened the nation’s capacity to attract and maintain foreign direct investment at 
levels comparable to other emerging Asian economies.  
 
1.2   Methodology: A Sector Analysis Approach 
 
While FDI has played a critical role in the development of the Pakistani economy 
over the last fifteen years, its effects have been varied across sectors. By applying a 
comparative sector analysis approach, this paper analyzes disaggregated units of the 
Pakistani economy, and examines the relationship between sectoral FDI inflows and three 
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The sectors analyzed in this study are energy, telecommunications, and financial 
services. The motivation behind choosing these sectors was threefold: First, the three 
sectors have on average been the largest recipients of FDI since 2000. Second, the three 
sectors represent important components of infrastructure development, and the services 
industry. By installing infrastructure for communications and energy, the 
Telecommunications and Energy sectors are developing resources that can promote 
investment in other areas of the economy such as manufacturing. The provision of such 
infrastructure is crucial to long-term capital gain and economic development within 
Pakistan. Financial Services plays an important role as a conduit of foreign direct 
investment. A well-developed financial services sector encourages higher levels of 
foreign investor confidence in the country. Third, public ownership of companies within 
each of the three sectors is drastically different: telecommunications is almost entirely 
privately owned, while energy is mostly owned or managed by the government. Financial 
services falls in the middle of the spectrum in terms of public ownership and government 
involvement. Performing a comparative sectoral analysis of three sectors that vary in 
terms of industry type and extent of government involvement, this study provides a 
unique perspective on the ways in which the effects of security, government efficacy and 
global FDI inflows vary across sectors within Pakistan. 
This study utilizes a variety of quantitative and qualitative data sources to analyze 
the effects of each of the independent variables on FDI inflows within Pakistan. For each 
of the three sectors, this paper measures the effects of government effectiveness, security, 
and global inflows of FDI on national and sectoral inflows of FDI between 2000 and 
 20 
2014. However, the paper is unable to analyze the effects of the independent variables on 
FDI between 2000 and 2002 due to unavailability of data.  
Data sources used in this study are: 1) Global Terrorism Index12 to measure 
security, 2) World Governance Indicators13 to measure government effectiveness and 
political stability, 3) UNCTAD’s World Investment Reports14 for data on global and 
national inflows of FDI between 2000 and 2014, and 4) Pakistan’s Board of Investment15 
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12 Produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace, the GTI is based on data from the Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD), which is collected and collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism. Source: http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf 
13 The World Governance Indicators report aggregate and individual governance indicators for 215 economies across 
six dimensions of governance: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. These indicators combine the views of a 
large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents, and are based on over 30 individual data sources 
produced by a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, 
and private sector firms. 
Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home 
14 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. World Investment Report 2015 
15 Pakistan Board of Investment. http://boi.gov.pk/foreigninvestmentinpakistan.aspx; Asian Development Bank, Private 
Sector Assessment: Pakistan. Page 9. Accessed January 2016. http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-
document/32216/private-sector-assessment.pdf 
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Country reports, market analyses, and investment risk reports published by 
international organizations, multi-national corporations, and Pakistani corporations were 
also utilized in this study. These include reports by the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Standard and Poor’s, International Finance Corporation, Arif Habib Bank, KPMG, and 
the World Bank. Qualitative information specific to each sector was primarily accessed 
from annual reports published by national regulatory authorities: National Electric Power 
Regulatory Authority (NEPRA), Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) for 
Telecommunications, and State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) for Financial Services. 
Interviews with researchers and practitioners working within the field of development 
economics, or each of the individual sectors, were also conducted. These interviews 
provided first-hand opinions of investors and development economists who are assessing 
the risks and benefits deterring or encouraging the decision to invest in Pakistan.  
 
1.3 Structure of the Paper: 
 
The chapters of this paper are as follows: Chapter Two discusses the role of the 
private sector in promoting economic growth within developing countries. The Chapter 
provides a brief overview of the evolution of development models from the 1950’s till 
present day, and discusses the growing importance of the private sector and foreign direct 
investment within the global development agenda. Chapter Three argues the importance 
of Pakistan as an important case in the study of FDI inflows to developing countries. The 
chapter begins by presenting an historical analysis of FDI inflows to Pakistan since the 
1970s, when the country began to move away from a policy of nationalization towards 
liberalizing the economy, opening it up to international markets. Next, it discusses 
 22 
present day opportunities available to investors within the country, followed by an 
overview of governance and security conditions within the country that have influenced 
domestic conditions and increased the level of risk associated with investing in Pakistan 
since 2000 until 2014. The chapter concludes with a comparative discussion of FDI 
inflows across Energy, Telecommunications, and Financial Services. Chapter Four, Five, 
and Six analyze the effects of government effectiveness, national security, and global 
trends in FDI in Energy, Telecommunications, and Financial Services respectively. The 
chapters offer a comparative sectoral analysis of the internal and external factors 
affecting FDI within Pakistan, and the ways in which the factors differently affect each of 
the sectors before and after the financial crash of 2008. Chapter Seven discusses steps the 
Pakistani government can take in order to provide a more stable investment climate 







Advancing the Global Partnership 
Importance of Private Sector Involvement in Economic Development 
 
 
 Since the introduction of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000, 
there has been a steady push towards the diversification of development financing. James 
Michel argues that the role of aid as the primary source of funding is quickly changing in 
many developing countries as alternative sources and strategies for financing become 
more prominent and popular.16 In 2015, the Investment to End Poverty Report by 
Development Initiatives presented a breakdown of financial flows to developing 
countries. Approximately USD 163 billion was disbursed in Official Development Aid 
(ODA), while international investment flows stood at USD 1.88 trillion in 2013.17 Private 
domestic and international investment flows in low and middle income countries have 
more than tripled over the last decade, accounting for over half of the financial resources 
available in 2015.18 As the influence of traditional development assistance gives way to 
an increasing diversity of actors, financers, and implementation approaches, it is 
becoming crucial to create a “global partnership” that integrates and streamlines 
international cooperation in a way that can positively affect development results.19  
                                                
16 Michel, James. P. 26.  
17 In the same year, commercial domestic spending was USD 2.2 trillion. Michel, James. P. viii. 
18 European Commission. A Stronger Role of the Private Sector in Achieving Inclusive and Sustainable Growth in 
Developing Countries. Brussels, 2014. Page 11. 
19 Michel, James. P. 26 
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 This chapter studies the role and influence of one actor—the private sector—
within the emerging global partnership. Given the private sector’s growing involvement 
in the developing world, and its capacity to finance infrastructure development by 
expanding capital stock, it is important to understand the role it has played historically 
and continues to play currently within the international development agenda. This chapter 
begins by presenting a brief history of the evolution of the field of development, followed 
by an examination of the present-day, post-2015 development agenda. It discusses the 
role of the private sector within the present day agenda, and concludes by discussing the 
influence of foreign direct investment as a driver of economic growth. 
 
2.1 A Brief Overview of Development Models: Post WW2 – Present 
 
Initial models of development emerging at the end of World War II focused 
almost entirely on economic growth and advocated for massive injections of capital as 
the means of achieving rapid increases in gross domestic product (GDP).  According to 
Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi, a noted Pakistani economist, the 1950’s – 1980’s marked the 
stage of Traditionalist Development. 20  This model emphasized the importance of, 
“achieving high rates of economic and human development in the post-colonial periods, 
with a view to reducing poverty and achieving convergence with the developed 
countries.”21 Agriculture was regarded as the leading sector in the process of growth 
creation. It was argued that gains within the agricultural sector would result in a 
“structural transformation” of labor allocation away from agriculture and towards 
                                                
20 Naqvi, Syed Nawab Haider. 2010. The Evolution of Development Policy: A Reinterpretation. Karachi; New York: 
Oxford University Press. Page 6. 
21 Ibid, p. 43 
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manufacturing and services.22  Mechanisms instituted for achieving this process included 
increasing the share of manufacturing activities within the economy along with 
implementing extensive land reforms.23 
By the end of the 1970’s and early 1980’s the Traditionalist model gave away to 
the emerging Liberalist paradigm. Liberalists argued that high growth rates observed in 
the post-colonial and post-WW2 era were artificially stimulated through extensive and 
unsustainable government intervention.24 Liberalist theorists—otherwise also called New 
Growth theorists—such as Paul Romer and Robert Lucas shifted the focus of the 
development agenda away from labor and capital restructuring. Instead, free market 
policies, that aggressively attempted to minimize the role of the government within the 
development process were prioritized. These policies were contained in the Washington 
Consensus: a set of ten strategies that the United States government and international 
financial institutions believed were necessary elements of “first stage policy reform,” that 
developing countries needed to adopt in order to increase economic growth.25 Liberalists 
rapidly introduced and implemented initiatives such as Structural Adjustment Programs 
(SAPs) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. SAPs radically 
altered the government-led development framework that had been established within the 
Traditionalist model by restructuring developing economies to become more market 
oriented. The Programs included policies requiring internal changes such as privatization 
and deregulation, and external changes such as the reduction of trade barriers. In many 
ways, the emergence of the Liberalist paradigm represented the beginning of the formal 
                                                
22 Dang, Giang, Low Sui Pheng, and Ohio Library and Information Network. 2014; 2015. Infrastructure Investments in 
Developing Economies: The Case of Vietnam. Singapore; 4: Springer. Page 16. 
23 Naqvi, Syed Nawab Haider. The Evolution of Development Policy: A Reinterpretation P. 6 
24 Ibid, P. 7 
25 Glossary. World Health Organization. Accessed April 2016. http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story094/en/ 
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involvement of the private sector as an independent and influential actor within the field 
of international development. 
 The Liberalist paradigm received extensive criticism from development 
economists that argued against the framework’s inattention to the importance of good 
governance and institutional structures, and questioned the model’s reliance on 
international aid transfers as the primary source of funding. 26 Critics claimed that free 
market approaches would encourage the dependency of developing countries on 
developed markets, multilateral institutions, and exploitative corporations. Maia Green 
argues that the pursuit of liberalist policies would result in the emergence of a 
“Development State.”27 The development state, she writes, are states that are, “materially 
and ideologically sustained through development relations. Such states are largely 
dependent on aid transfers to meet recurrent budgets.”28 The development state is fiscally 
dependent on international development financing and on the institutions that disburse 
this financing. By extension, the development state is required to follow the strategies 
employed by international finance agencies, resulting in their inability to develop 
independently and strengthen domestic institutions or the economy.  
 A growing acceptance of the limitations of Liberalist development ideology 
reintroduced the need to prioritize more than just the expansion of the free-market, 
resulting in the emergence of the Human Development Model in the mid-1990s. The 
model directed attention away from prioritizing market friendly approaches towards 
identifying ways to improve standards of living in developing countries. While the 
                                                
26 Dang and Pheng, P. 19 
27 Green, Maia. 2014. The development state: aid, culture & civil society in Tanzania. Woodbridge, Suffolk. Page 15. 
Maia Green is a Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Manchester 
28 Ibid. 
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market—and by extension the private sector—was still important, the Human 
Development Model did not consider it to be the sole or primary route through which 
development could be pursued. David Booth presents the argument that weak or 
dysfunctional political systems present barriers to the construction of more 
developmental leadership. 29  A stable government allows for the integration of 
multifaceted aspects of development in a way that allows for sustainable transformation, 
implementable policy, and concrete results. The Human Development Model 
reintroduced the value of good governance as a necessary ingredient for sustainable 
development, alongside the development of the private sector. The model in many ways, 
serves as an initial introduction to what has since been termed the global partnership. 
The Human Development Model forms the basis of the present day development 
agenda. The next section of this chapter discusses the design of the Millennium 
Development Goals introduced in the early 2000’s, and the subsequent construction of 
the Post-2015 Development Agenda. The Millennium Development Goals and the Post-
2015 Development Agenda encapsulate and expand ideas presented in the Human 
Development Model, identifying ways to integrate a variety of actors and stakeholders 
into the development process.  
 
2.2: Development Today: Advancing the Role of the Private Sector 
 
From 2000 until 2015, the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) served as the primary development model. The MDGs focus on core issue areas 
such as poverty alleviation, gender equality, education, health, sustainability, and female 
                                                
29 Booth, David. 2011. Can aid become more relevant to ‘getting things done’? World Bank. Accessed February 2016. 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/governance/can-aid-become-more-relevant-to-getting-things-done 
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equality. While Traditionalist and Liberalist theorists differed on the basis of whether 
government or markets should be the primary actor guiding the development process, the 
MDGs advocated for synthesizing of the two positions, focusing instead on the creation 
of a global partnership. This partnership would incorporate a diverse range of actors and 
stakeholders including governments, multilateral organizations, and private institutions in 
the development process. Such a strategy emerged from a recognition of the challenges 
associated with achieving any of the listed MDGs. The consensus was that a partnership 
was necessary in order to successfully meet the targets set out in the MDGs. In particular, 
the MDGs focused on the importance of developing a strong relationship between the 
private sector and domestic governments. The role of the private sector as a provider of 
financing and capital in developing countries where governments had limited resources 
was particularly important. Given that investment decisions made by the private sector 
are motivated by considerations of benefits and risks, the existence of a partnership 
between foreign companies and domestic governments allows for a clearer understanding 
of the opportunity set existent within a specific country. Further, such a partnership 
understands the necessity of including and supporting domestic governments within the 
development agenda, a consideration that was not forgotten within the MDGs.  
In 2014 the European Commission released a report advocating for a stronger role 
of the private sector in achieving inclusive and sustainable growth in developing 
countries.30 The Commission argued that by increasing investment and playing a more 
active role in the development process the private sector could send a “powerful signal 
about the important role it can play in contributing to inclusive and sustainable growth in 
                                                
30 European Commission, p. 16. 
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developing countries.”31 Given the diversity of the private sector in terms of capacity, 
opportunity and approach, it is able to operate at different levels and regions of the 
economy and in very different country contexts.  
The current Post-2015 development agenda continues with the goal-oriented 
vision established by the MDGs through global partnership. The agenda relies on two 
foundational pillars: (1) a commitment to human wellbeing, security and dignity as was 
laid out in the Human Development Model of development, and (2) a commitment to 
sustainable development.32 James Michel has argued that the, “successful implementation 
of the new agenda will require that international cooperation proceed in new ways that 
transcend the traditional aid-centered paradigm.”33 He identifies the growing need to “do 
development differently,” and focus attention on national priorities, interests and 
systems.34 The new agenda demands that we look beyond aid as the primary source of 
development financing. As Michel argues, it is necessary to, “include all available 
sources and types of financing, [and] expand domestic resource mobilization…while 
conserving resources and increasing efficiency and effectiveness.” By recognizing the 
role and actively taking advantage of the foreign private sector within the global 
partnership, the Post-2015 Development Agenda is creating access to an economic pool 
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2.4 Foreign Direct Investment as a Driver of Economic Growth 
 
FDI has become one of the most important sources of international capital flows 
to developing countries and is directly influencing domestic private entrepreneurship. 
FDI is considered to be the largest source of capital formation in the world and is often 
presented as a key element for international economic integration and development.35 
The development of an emerging or frontier market is correlated with its ability to 
expand stock of knowledge, accumulate capital, and make profitable investments. 
Muhammad Arshad Khan, a researcher at Pakistan Institute for Development Economics, 
argues that most developing countries rely primarily on FDI as a source of external 
finance because FDI is able to stimulate greater economic growth relative to other 
sources of capital inflows.36  Modernization theories suggest that FDI can promote 
economic growth under the principle that growth requires high levels of investment.37 
Through capital accumulation, FDI is able to introduce new forms of technology into the 
production function of the domestic economy.38 Growth theories emphasize the effect of 
such technological transfers on encouraging employment growth and education, allowing 
for skill acquisition and the development of human capital. FDI is important for filling 
the gap between domestic savings and the desired level of investment in developing 
countries, allowing for capital formation and sustained economic growth. 
During the last decade, several developing countries have recognized that 
restricting FDI inflows is an ineffective and sometimes counterproductive policy.  In an 
                                                
35 Zeb, Nayyra et al. Role of Foreign Direct Investment in Economic Growth of Pakistan. 
36 Arshad Khan, Muhammad and Ali Khan, Shujaat, Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan: The Role of International 
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37 Zeb, Nayyra et al. Role of Foreign Direct Investment in Economic Growth of Pakistan. 
38 Toulaboe, Dosse et al. Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in Developing Countries. Southwestern 
Economic Review 36, no. 1(2013): 155 – 170. Page 158. 
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attempt to encourage FDI inflows many low-income countries have worked towards 
removing trade restrictions, adopting liberal, market-oriented reforms that favor the 
interests of foreign investors.39 According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), FDI inflows to developing countries as a percentage of global 
FDI inflows grew from approximately 33% in 2006 to 54% in 2013. 40 However, while 
reforms have increased FDI inflows to the developing world, concerns regarding negative 
domestic and international externalities have not been lost. Dependency theories for 
instance suggest that reliance on foreign investment by low-income economies may result 
in a negative impact on growth and income distribution. Dependence on foreign capital 
and means of employment may result in the underutilization of domestic resources, 
effectively crowding out domestic investment.41 In order to prevent such a dynamic it is 
crucial for domestic policies instituted by the host country to establish an interaction 
between foreign investors and domestic stakeholders within the economy. 
 Ultimately however, the effects of FDI on investment and economic growth are 
specific to a country. Distinct domestic political and economic circumstances mean that 
empirical studies are unable to provide conclusive cross-country results regarding the true 
effect of FDI in a given developing country. Effects of FDI on sustainable economic 
growth are invariably tied to the capacity of the foreign private sector to collaborate with 
and be supported by domestic governments. It is important to remember that private 
sector involvement is only one aspect of the Post-2015 development agenda. The goal of 
this paper is not to determine whether the inclusion of the private sector within the 
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development agenda is inherently beneficial or not. Rather, given international trends 
regarding the growth of FDI in developing countries, this paper recognizes the 
importance of studying the role of the private sector as a driver of economic growth and a 
provider of development financing. 
 The next chapter discusses historical trends of FDI inflows within Pakistan. It 
examines policies that have been implemented since the 1970’s to attract FDI, and 
discusses the present day opportunity set for foreign investors interested in investing in 
Pakistan. The final section of the chapter provides an overview of events that have 







Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries 
Pakistan as an Important Case Study 
 
 
Pakistan’s foreign investment regime is one of the most liberal and attractive in 
South Asia. The government of Pakistan offers foreign investors 100% project ownership 
in a vast number of sectors and allows the remittance of capital, profits and dividends 
without any regulatory approvals.42 Yet FDI inflows to Pakistan lag behind the nation’s 
regional or economic counterparts. The goal of this chapter is to discuss the evolution of 
Pakistan’s policies for attracting FDI, and to examine events occurring between 2000 and 
2014 that affected government effectiveness and national security levels in Pakistan, and 
altered global investment trends internationally. The first section of this chapter provides 
an historical overview of FDI inflows to Pakistan from the 1970’s until today. The next 
section explores present day opportunities available to foreign investors interested in 
investing in Pakistan. Section three provides an account of major shifts occurring 
domestically and within the international economy, and discusses the ways in which 
changes in government efficacy, security, and global investment trends affected national 
FDI inflows. The chapter concludes with a comparison of FDI inflows between the three 
sectors analyzed in this paper namely energy, telecommunications, and financial services. 
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3.1: Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan: A Historical Analysis 
(1970’s – Present) 
 
Prior to the late 1970’s, Pakistan’s trade and investment policies vacillated 
between import substitutions and export promotion. Nationalization under the Zulfiqar 
Ali Bhutto regime in the early 1970’s made the government the largest player in the 
economy. While foreign investments were not nationalized, an increased focus on the 
public sector and excessive regulation of trade discouraged foreign investors.43  
Recognizing the consequences of nationalization on foreign investment, the 
government began to draft policies intended to be friendlier towards foreign investors by 
the mid-1970’s. The Foreign Private Investment Act of 1976 marked the beginning of the 
establishment of a regulatory framework that facilitated and protected the transactions of 
foreign investors. The Act of 1976 guaranteed the remittance of profit and capital, and 
introduced policies that avoided double taxation, lowering initial costs of investment for 
foreign parties.44 
 In 1984 an industrial policy statement that gave equal weight to the public and 
private sectors was announced. The policy encouraged foreign investment in the form of 
joint equity participation with local areas, thereby establishing a business climate that 
was more favorable for foreign investors. As Figure 2 indicates, the mid-1980’s mark the 
beginning of a fairly sustained increase in FDI inflows to Pakistan until 2008. FDI 
inflows grew from 0.3% of GDP in 1986 to 0.6% in 1990.  
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 During the 1980’s and 1990’s, the Government of Pakistan initiated several 
market-based reforms liberalizing the trade and investment regime by introducing various 
trade and fiscal incentives to foreign investors. These provisions included increased tax 
concessions, credit facilities, tariff reduction, and the easing of foreign exchange 
controls.45 Remnants of restrictions on capital inflows and outflows that had been placed 
during the period of nationalization continued to be lifted. Foreign investors were 
allowed to hold 100% of the equity of their industrial project and remittance of dividends 
and disinvestment proceeds were permissible without any prior permission of the State 
Bank of Pakistan.46 The establishment of the Pakistan Board of Investment in 1990 
helped generate opportunities for FDI within Pakistan and provide investment services to 
interested foreign investors. These initiatives placed Pakistan on the International Finance 
Corporation’s list of emerging South Asian stock markets in 1992, along with India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. The country was also ranked an emerging market by 
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Figure 2: Net Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment as a % of GDP, 1970 – 2013 
Source: World Bank 
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MSCI in 1997, a placement that reflected upon development within the economy, 
deepening of domestic financial markets, and increased accessibility of capital markets to 
international investors.47  
By 1997 the Government had announced the New Investment Policy that aimed to 
increase foreign investment in areas such as industrial base expansion, infrastructure, 
software development, electronics, construction industries, and value-added textile items. 
The push towards developing the manufacturing sector and advancing overall levels of 
infrastructure within the country was central to this new policy, and allowed foreign 
investors to capitalize on opportunities within sectors that had initially been closed to 
them. The policy provided various tariff and tax incentives and continued to protect the 
foreign investors’ rights to remit royalties, technical fees, capital, profit and dividends. 
However, a weakened international economic climate caused by the 1997 Asian 
Economic Crisis and a fragile democratic government meant that the introduction of the 
policy was unable to produce much growth in FDI inflows towards the end of the decade.  
FDI Inflows began to stabilize and grow again in Pakistan by 2000. During the 
Musharraf era (1999—2008), policy makers worked to create an environment where 
foreign direct investment was able to thrive. In his memoir, In the Line of Fire, Pervez 
Musharraf states the four-pronged strategy his administration pursued: 1) achieving 
macroeconomic stability, 2) making structural reforms to remove microeconomic 
distortion, 3) improving the quality of governance, and 4) alleviating poverty. 48 
Deregulation, fiscal incentives, and liberal remittance of profits and capital were core 
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tenets of the nation’s investment policy.49  The privatization of enterprises was fully 
protected which meant that the government legally could not nationalize or expropriate 
any foreign enterprises. Additionally, the Pakistani government introduced measures to 
reduce red tape, rationalized utility charges, and improved infrastructure. Expenditure on 
health and education grew, creating a progressive economic environment that was 
attractive to foreign investors. These policies diminished distortions within the market, 
increased the efficiency of exchange, and reduced levels of perceived risk and uncertainty 
regarding the sudden alteration of economic policies. FDI net inflows increased sharply 
within the earlier half of the decade, increasing from US$ 534 million in 2003 to peaking 
at US$ 5.6 billion in 2008 (Figure 3).  
 
While the level of growth experienced within Pakistan during this time was 
impressive, it is important to note that the nation’s FDI levels lagged behind the rest of 
the developing world. In 2007 capital inflows to Pakistan were 4% of GDP while average 
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Figure 3: Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Pakistan, 2001 – 2013 
















capital inflows to other developing countries were 7.5% of GDP.50 It has been argued that 
the reasons for this difference stem from an unstable political environment, inadequate 
infrastructure, and high levels of security risk, concerns that were not as present in other 
developing and emerging markets. Even though the Pakistani economy was growing 
rapidly, the country was still in its early stages of development, and thus more vulnerable 
to domestic and external shocks as compared to its regional counterparts. Hence, the 
deterioration of government effectiveness, national security, and global investment levels 
post-2008 triggered an immediate and severe reduction in FDI inflows to Pakistan. 
Following calls for Musharraf’s impeachment and his subsequent departure in 
2008, the Pakistani economy moved from rapid rates of growth to a state of crisis. Real 
GDP growth slowed sharply and foreign exchange reserves plunged. Heightened security 
concerns consumed the newly elected fractious and fragile democratic government’s 
attention, causing economic crises to be deprioritized as a time when they demanded 
more attention. Low investment in human capital, shortage of energy, and rising security 
concerns challenged the nation’s capacity to attract foreign investors. The global financial 
crash of 2008 induced further stress on the domestic economy as Pakistani exporters 
struggled to sell their goods to the nation’s largest export market, the United States. 
Deteriorating diplomatic relations and failure by the Pakistani government to service the 
nation’s debt increased uncertainty over future returns, discouraging foreign firms to 
invest in Pakistan.51 As a result, Pakistan failed to rank on MSCI’s list of emerging 
markets in 2012, or Standard and Poor’s list of emerging stock markets.52  
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Today, the Pakistani government is acutely aware of the need to boost Pakistan’s 
image as a competitive investment location relative to other emerging economies.53 In 
2013 the Board of Investment (BOI) published a report discussing their strategy for 
attracting FDI between 2013 and 2017. The report acknowledges that Pakistan is a high-
risk investment proposition. The report states that, “boosting Pakistan’s international 
competitiveness on a global scale will be crucial in reaching Pakistan’s growth targets in 
general and its FDI targets in particular.”54 To that end the Investment Policy of 2013, 
which is outlined within the 2013-2017 BOI Strategy Report, focuses specifically on 
enhancing Pakistan’s international image as an investment location.  
In October 2014 the Board of Investment hosted a two-day conference for foreign 
companies registered with the department to discuss this policy. The Board introduced 
several additional incentives for foreign investors including 100% tax credit for five years 
on new industries established by June 30th 2016, as well as credit for investment in 
infrastructure updates, extensions and replacements.55 Additionally, the development of 
the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a mega bilateral project that aims to 
connect Pakistan’s southwestern Port of Gwadar to the northwestern region of Xinjiang, 
China, has allowed foreign investment within Pakistan to increase again, especially in the 
telecommunication, energy and transportation sectors. These shifts have stimulated 
moderate growth in FDI inflows to the country since 2013. Positive economic growth 
trends have refocused attention on opportunities existent within Pakistan, allowing for 
FDI inflows to advance development efforts within the country. The next section of this 
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chapter discusses the importance of FDI within Pakistan, and presents reasons for why 
the country has latent potential to serve as an attractive host country for FDI. 
 
3.2 Investing in Pakistan: Opportunities and Risks  
 
FDI has served as one of the main sources of foreign capital inflows to Pakistan 
since the 1960’s along with international aid, and is considered an important vehicle for 
economic growth within the country.56 The Pakistani government’s desire to attract high 
levels of FDI inflows has resulted in the creation of the most liberal foreign investment 
frameworks in South Asia, allowing foreign investors to own up to 100% of their equity, 
repatriate a 100% of profits, and receive numerous tax holidays such as a 100% tax credit 
for five years on new industries or new equity investment.57 
Pakistan has one of the highest consumption-to-GDP ratios in the region, driven 
by a rapidly urbanizing population. With more than 180 million citizens, and the age 
demographic skewed towards the youth, there is great capacity for growth within sectors 
such as Telecommunications, Financial Services, Energy, Textiles and Information 
Technology.58 Foreign investors can benefit from the trend of youth entrepreneurship in 
Pakistan which can potentially induce a paradigm shift in the economy.59 Pakistan’s 
location as a shipping hub, neighboring two BRIC economies—China and India, as well 
as Iran, a fast growing economy, provides foreign investors with opportunities for 
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regional trade. Pakistan’s strengthening relationship with China is encouraging the most 
significant incline in FDI inflows to the Pakistan since the early 2000’s.  
However, several factors deter foreign investors from investing in Pakistan. These 
include internal concerns such as government inefficacy and security concerns, and 
external considerations such as changes in global economic trends, each of which are 
variables this paper employs to analyze FDI trends across sectors within Pakistan.  
One of the key hindrances to Pakistan’s growth story is its low investment-to-
GDP ratio. The ratio stood at 13.5% in 2014, one of the lowest in the world.60 As a result 
the government has been unable to develop infrastructure, resulting in limited provision 
of facilities such as energy, water, or consistently paved roads. Additionally following the 
decision to participate in the War on Terror, Pakistan has been perceived as a nation with 
poor national security. These limitations along with poor government efficacy and 
political instability have resulted in FDI moving away from Pakistan and towards those 
developing markets that are less risky to foreign investors. 
  Today, Pakistan continues to be perceived as a high-risk high-return investment 
proposition. The next section of this chapter provides an overview of events occurring 
during the last fifteen years that drastically changed domestic conditions. Understanding 
the events that contributed to deteriorating political and economic conditions within 
Pakistan allows for an accurate understanding of why the nation has found it difficult to 
attract and maintain sustainable levels of FDI particularly post-2008. 
 
                                                
60 Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance. Pakistan Economic Survey. 2013-14. Accessed December 2015. 
http://finance.gov.pk/survey_1314.html 
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3.3 The Last Fifteen Years: Internal and External Shocks to the 
Pakistani Economy 
 
Since 2000 Pakistan has witnessed drastic changes in the amount of inflows it has 
received. This section provides an account of major internal and external events 
occurring during the last fifteen years that have affected FDI inflows within the country. 
 
2000 – 2004: 
During the first half of the decade, Pakistan moved away from a stable military 
regime presided by Pervez Musharraf, to one that was rapidly weakening due to growing 
demands for democracy. Pakistan nominally returned to civilian rule in late November 
2002 with the creation of Musharraf’s “democratic” party, the Pakistan Muslim League - 
Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q), although Musharraf still retained massive powers including the 
ability to dismiss the elected parliament. In 2002 PML-Q formed a coalition government 
with a majority of one vote, attempting to combine democracy with military rule, and 
faced the strongest opposition in Pakistan’s recent history.61  
At the same time, however, economic performance remained strong. The country 
recorded an estimated 4.7% current account surplus in 2002.62 According to the Federal 
Bureau of Reserves exports grew by more than 16% between July and December of 
2002, reaching a value of USD 4.71 billion.63 By 2004 the IMF commended Pakistan, 
stating that a host of structural reforms had been implemented and the debt situation had 
improved.64 Further, they suggested that while external support had been beneficial the 
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improvement primarily reflected a government-led change of policy implementation and 
enforcement. 65  Government effectiveness as measured by the World Governance 
Indicators improved marginally during this time. The IMF asserted their concerns about 
public expenditure management and the slow pace of reform in sectors such as power 
generation. These issues aggravated conditions in Pakistan post-2008 when the country 
witnessed a rapid decline in political stability, coinciding with deep economic shocks and 
growing security concerns that resulted in a decline in FDI inflows to the country.66  
 
2005 – 2009: 
Efforts made by policy makers to restructure laws and regulatory bodies in 
Pakistan created an environment conducive to the foreign private sector’s involvement 
and participation. The Pakistani government increased expenditure on healthcare and 
education initiatives to promote Pakistan’s long-run economic growth potential. Both, 
foreign and domestic private investment grew within this time period. Government 
effectiveness increased marginally between 2005 and 2006, as measured by the World 
Governance Indicators. The economy continued to expand until 2007, and Pakistan 
experienced a peak in FDI inflows, resulting in the investment growth rate to reach nearly 
20%.67 The government continued to focus on private sector expansion as a tool for 
economic growth and development. Measures incentivizing FDI included reforms in the 
banking and utility sectors, and efforts to reduce red tape.68 
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However, Pakistan’s sustainability and competitiveness as an international player 
was limited due to vested national political interests, and weakening military rule that 
was giving away to an even weaker democratic setup. In 2007, rising international oil 
prices and domestic inflation started to threaten macroeconomic stability. Rapid 
economic growth and development within Pakistan stopped abruptly by the end of 2007 
and early 2008, when the country was faced with simultaneous internal and external 
shocks. The global financial crash of 2008 resulted in a significant loss of FDI, as global 
investment levels declined. The political system was in shambles as Pervez Musharraf 
refused to relinquish power, and imposed a state of emergency. Musharraf’s suspension 
of Supreme Court judges in November 2007 furthered his unpopularity, fueled calls for 
his dismissal, and resulted in declining government effectiveness. The assassination of 
Benazir Bhutto, returned past Prime Minister and leader of the opposition, deepened the 
political crisis, and raised concerns regarding national security provision in Pakistan. 
The escalation of security risks and the destabilization of the Pakistani 
government, combined with a weakened international investment climate between the 
end of 2007 and early 2008 had a strong, negative effect on FDI inflows. While most 
South Asian countries were able to attract FDI between two to three years of the global 
economic crash, inflows within Pakistan continued to decline. Predictions of investment 
growth, which had been the main driver of economic growth, fell from 20% a year to 
6.9% a year by the beginning of 2008. The sharp increases in political and operational 
risk in recent months no longer allowed the liberalized economy to present itself as an 
opportunity that was independent of the political situation within the country.69 
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By November 2008 Asif Ali Zardari, husband of Benazir Bhutto and the new 
leader of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), was elected President of the country. During 
his presidency economic policy focused on short-term crisis management. Despite 
reluctance to rely on the IMF, the government turned to the organization for assistance in 
November 2008. By accepting IMF financing, the Pakistani government lost an extensive 
degree of autonomy in designing economy policy, and was required to eliminated 
subsidies in sectors like Energy. Investment growth continued to contract, curtailing 
public expenditure. 
By July 2009 the Pakistani army had launched a large-scale offensive against the 
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the North West Frontier Province (since renamed 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [KP]), with intentions to expand to the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA).70 The War on Terror required Pakistan to increase its military 
budget, and raised concerns regarding security provision in the country. 71 The 
simultaneous security and economic crisis added to the concerns of a divided and weak 
democratic government, and fueled growing anti-government sentiment among the 
general population. Given the poor international economic climate, foreign investors 
were not prepared to invest in Pakistan at a time when political stability was weak, 
government effectiveness was low, and security provision was in decline. Thus, Pakistan 
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2010 – 2014: 
 By 2010, the Economist Intelligence Unit predicted a meager 1.5% annual rate of 
investment growth in Pakistan. Remittances were now the main driver of economic 
growth within the country. The economy continued to be constrained by a lack of 
improvement in security and limited infrastructure capacities.72 The floods of 2010, 
which resulted in the death of more than 2,000 people only exacerbated the situation. 
Millions more were displaced, redirecting the government’s attention to immediate 
rescue, rehabilitation and crisis management efforts. Pakistan continued to remain heavily 
dependent on multilateral institutions and bilateral donors for concessional loans and 
emergency aid during this time.73 
 Relations between Pakistan’s main political parties remained volatile. 
Government effectiveness as ranked by the Economist Intelligence Unit and the World 
Bank’s World Governance Indicators stayed low, and growing pressures on Zardari’s 
government meant that political stability remained a dim possibility. The capture of 
Osama Bin Laden in 2011 by U.S. Special Forces refocused negative attention on 
Pakistan. Questions regarding the capacity and will of the Pakistani government to 
combat terrorism raised security concerns and contributed to a further withdrawal of FDI. 
Economic expansion continued to fall short of potential due to poor policy-
making, shortages of energy and water, ongoing security concerns, and low investment in 
human capital. 74  Tighter domestic credit markets and a continued lack of foreign 
financing further weakened the position of the country. 
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 Following the national elections of 2013, many speculated the possibility of an 
upswing in domestic circumstances. Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) was elected Prime Minister 
in June 2013.75 His priorities to curb the domestic energy crisis and control terrorism 
fared well for the possibility of political stability. In 2014 FDI inflows recorded modest 
growth. However, due to constant power outages, poor basic infrastructure, and weak 
security conditions, Pakistan has been unable to take full advantage of international 
economic stability and opportunity. It is likely that the USD 46 billion CPEC trade deal 
will allow for development in power and infrastructure. China’s involvement in Pakistan 
will help promote economic links between Pakistan’s Gwadar port and China’s Xinjiang 
province.76 Such a partnership is likely to help boost the economy and promote foreign 
investment within the country. 
 
3.4: A Sectoral Comparison of FDI inflows to Energy, 
Telecommunications and Financial Services from 2000 – 2015 
 
FDI inflows to Pakistan grew rapidly between 2000 and 2007 (Figure 4). 
Attracting USD 308 million in 2000, FDI inflows peaked at USD 5.29 billion in 2007.77 
Soon thereafter inflows began to decline, dropping to USD 5.4 billion in 2008 and to US 
$859 million by 2012. While open, market-oriented polices contributed to a positive 
investment environment in the mid-2000s, the simultaneous occurrence of numerous 
external and internal shocks such as declining government effectiveness, weakening 
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national security. and diminishing levels of global investment caused a significant 
reduction in foreign investor confidence in Pakistan, 
 
Between 2000 and 2014, FDI inflows to the Energy, Telecommunications and 
Financial Services Sector accounted for an average of 68% of total FDI inflows to the 
country.78 Trends in FDI inflows within these three sectors as compared with national 
FDI trends during this time period, however, have varied. Inflows to the Energy Sector 
have remained almost entirely consistent between 2005 and 2015, only increasing slightly 
between 2006 and 2008 (Figure 4). FDI inflows to the Telecommunications Sector 
weakly match national FDI inflow trends between 2004 and 2009. However, the sector 
has been unable to increase growth in FDI inflows since then. FDI inflows to Financial 
Services are normally distributed around 2007-08, and closely match trends in national 
FDI inflows. Differences in inclines and declines in FDI inflows across Energy, 
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Figure 4: Differences in Inflows of FDI to Pakistan Across Sectors ,2000 - 2015 














Telecommunications, and Financial Services suggest that changes in political stability, 
government effectiveness, security, and global investment levels have had different 
effects across sectors and the economy as a whole. The next three chapters offer a 
comparative sectoral analysis of FDI inflows to each of these three sectors between 2000 
and 2014, and examine the ways in which government effectiveness, national security, 







Power and Energy 
 
 
Power cuts and energy shortages have created an inescapable bottleneck to 
advancing long-term economic growth and development within Pakistan. Dr. Musadik 
Mailk, special assistant to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, maintains that the energy crisis 
is a result of three major issues: the wide gap between supply and demand, the high cost 
of power, and “inefficiencies” within the system, a code word for electricity theft across 
the country.79 The National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) has estimated 
that repeated breakdowns and shortfalls of power have resulted in a 2-3% reduction in the 
GDP of the country. 80  Given high capital costs, it is unlikely that the Pakistani 
government will be able to restructure the sector independently. Therefore, there is a need 
to integrate the private energy sector as part of a broader sectoral reform framework.81 
Writers such as Michael Kugelman82, Javed Akbar83, and Afia Malik84 have stressed the 
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importance of private sector involvement, particularly foreign private sector involvement, 
in the restructuring and advancement of Pakistan’s energy sector. However, poor policy 
implementation, an inability by the government to fulfill commitments made to private 
investors, and a precarious security situation has discouraged foreign investors from 
investing in Pakistan’s energy sector. According to the United States Institute of Peace, 
almost all foreign companies that financed generation projects in the 1990’s had sold off 
a portion their shareholdings by 2015.85  
This chapter analyzes the effects of government effectiveness, security, and global 
FDI inflows on inflows of FDI to the Energy Sector in Pakistan. It argues that the foreign 
private sector has been deterred from investing in Pakistan’s energy sector due to weak 
government efficacy and growing security risks. The first section of this chapter provides 
an overview of energy production and distribution systems within Pakistan, and discusses 
the role of the foreign private sector within the industry. The following sections discuss 
the effect of each of the three independent variables on FDI inflows to the energy sector. 
The chapter concludes with a comparative analysis of the implications each of the 
variables might have on future policies and government strategy. 
 
4.1 An Overview of the Energy Sector in Pakistan: 
 
At the time of independence, Pakistan’s power generation capacity rested at a 
meager 60 mega-watts (MW). By the mid-1960’s the nation’s generation capacity had 
increased to approximately 2,500 MW.86 Rapid domestic industrialization and a growing 
                                                
85 Aziz, Rashid and Munawar Baseer Ahmad. 2015. Pakistan's Power Crisis: The Way Forward. Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace. P. 5 
86 An Overview of Electricity Sector in Pakistan. Islamabad: Islamabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Chp. 1.1 
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population demanded growth within the sector. During the 1980’s the government began 
introducing reforms to attract foreign investment inflows to the energy sector. 87 These 
reforms were unable to attract a significant response and demand continued to increase 
well into the early 1990's, causing frequent and massive blackouts throughout the decade. 
As a response to the growing gap in supply versus demand for energy, the government 
created the 1994 Power Policy, which introduced a series of incentives and returns on 
investment for private foreign investors interested in Pakistan’s energy sector. The most 
important of these incentives was that the Pakistani government guaranteed itself as a 
buyer of the power supplied by the private sector. By signing exclusive Power Purchase 
Agreements with private investors—domestic or foreign—the Pakistani government and 
the private investor agreed on a rate at which units of energy would be sold to the 
government. The Agreements also guaranteed investors a return on equity for the power 
plant. Additionally, the price at which energy was bought was dollar-indexed which 
meant that the private investor was protected against fluctuations in the Pakistani rupee.88 
By offering these provisions, and effectively pledging a guaranteed return on private 
investment in Pakistan’s energy sector, the Pakistani government aimed reduced the risk 
and uncertainty associated with investing in the energy sector for foreign investors. 
A Private Power and Infrastructure Board (PPIB) was set up in 1994 to oversee 
the implementation of this policy. In 1997, NEPRA was formed to oversee transparency 
and regulation in the Energy sector. NEPRA’s main responsibilities were to, “issue 
licenses for generation, transmission, and distribution of electric power; establish and 
enforce standards to ensure quality and safety of operation and supply of electric power 
                                                
87 Annual Report, 2004-05, National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) 
88 Majid Munir in discussion with the author, February 2016. 
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to consumers; approve investment and power acquisition programs of the utility 
companies; and determine tariffs for generation, transmission and distribution of electric 
power.”89 
Between 2001 and 2005, annual growth in electricity consumption was 
approximately 7.5%.90 Demand for electricity grew by 3-4% annually until 2004.91 In 
order to keep up with demand, high investments in the energy sector were required, 
placing pressuring the Pakistani government to deliver results quickly. During this time, 
Pakistan’s power sector comprised of four main power producers: 1) Water and Power 
Development Authority (WAPDA), 2) Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), 3) 
Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (KESC), and 4) Independent Power Producers 
(IPPs).92 Of the four producers, WAPDA and PAEC were publically owned companies.  
Policy changes and attempts at regulation played a pivotal role in enabling the 
establishment of several private plants during the growth years in Pakistan.93 To meet 
demand, the government increased its reliance on private energy producers. By 2005 
there were twenty-one IPPs operating in Pakistan, a marked increase since 1994, when 
there were fifteen.94 Additionally KESC, a publicly owned company, was privatized in 
November 2005 when multiple Pakistani and foreign businesses purchased a 71% stake 
in the company.95 
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Since privatization, the Pakistani government has retained a minimum 27% in KESC—since renamed K-Electric—to 
serve as, “a measure of comfort to the prospective buyer of the utility.” K-Electric is a vertically integrated private 
company responsible for the generation, transmission, and distribution of electric power in its area, which includes the 
 54 
Since privatization, K-Electric’s financial and operational performance has 
improved. In the first five years post-privatization, the company increased generation 
capacity and fuel efficiency by 39%, and reduced transmission and distribution losses 
from 36% to 28%.96 K-Electric's net losses decreased from PKR 15.5 billion in 2009, to 
PKR 14.6 billion in 2010.97 By 2012, the company reported a profit of 2.6 billion rupees. 
Saad Hasan, a writer at the Express Tribune, a Pakistani English daily, wrote: “The 
power utility has come a long way since it was privatized in 2005. From a company beset 
by rampant theft, [a] network of rickety power lines and corruption [when it was 
publically owned], it has emerged as a benchmark for other electricity suppliers in 
Pakistan.”98 The company has been able to incorporate additional private investment 
within its structure by contracting engineering companies such as Siemens (German) and 
Descon (Pakistani). These opportunities have influenced the increase in FDI inflows to 
the Energy sector since the end of 2005 (Figure 4), and provide the basis for Pakistani 
economists and researchers to conclude that Pakistani investment needs in the energy 
sector cannot be met by the public sector alone.99 
Since 2005-06, growth in FDI inflows to Pakistan’s energy sector has remained 
nearly consistent, increasing marginally between 2006 and 2009, but declining again in 
2010 (Figure 4). Increases in FDI inflows to the energy sector between 2000 and 2014 
did not directly correspond with the introduction of policy incentives offered by the 
                                                                                                                                            
city of Karachi, and certain areas in the province of Balochistan. K-Electric serviced approximately 80 billion Pakistani 
rupees of debt with the Pakistani government in exchange for equity in the company, and arranged for public entities to 
pay their outstanding dues. (Annual Report 2005-06, NEPRA. P. 5; Annual Report, 2014-15, NEPRA. P. 22, 139) 
96 Akbar, Javed. Addressing the Present Energy Crisis by Avoiding Mistakes of the Past. Published in Kugelman, 
Michael, ed. 2015. P. 12 
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98 Hasan, Saad. Turnaround: The Story Behind K-Electric’s Rs12b in Profits. The Express Tribune, September 26, 
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government, which suggests that policy incentives were not the primary factors 
motivating or deterring foreign investors from investing in Pakistan’s energy sector. Dr. 
Ashfaque Khan argues that increased incentives were ineffective due to poor long-term 
planning by the Pakistani government, weak oversight, and high sunk costs of capital, 
which increased the risk of investing in the sector.100 The government’s inability to 
perform on promises made in the 1994 Power Policy by providing adequate liquidity to 
foreign investors created a number of fiscal, financial and transparency related issues for 
foreign investors interested in investing in Pakistan's energy sector.  
Issues of weak government oversight and rising security risks have presented 
themselves in different capacities throughout the last fifteen years. The next three 
sections of this chapter discuss the ways in which governance, security, and global 
investment trends have affected FDI inflows to the energy sector between 2000 and 2014. 
 
Government Effectiveness and Inflows of FDI to Energy: 
 
The Pakistani government is the sole buyer of power sold by private producers 
within the country. As part of the 1994 Power Plan, the government and private 
producers sign Power Purchase Agreements at the time when the private investor invests 
in the energy sector. The Agreement outlines the rate at which the government will buy 
energy from the private producer. Given the wide gap between demand and supply of 
energy in Pakistan, and the government’s inability to reduce this gap, the Energy sector is 
very much a seller’s market. The government therefore buys electricity at the value 
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provided by the power producer, which makes the per-unit cost of private energy more 
expensive as compared to energy produced by publically owned companies. Additionally, 
the government subsidizes electricity for its consumers—the Pakistani public, and is 
therefore unable to recover costs. Consequently, the Pakistani government is unable to 
provide timely compensation to power companies, which results in the creation of 
“circular debt,” a problem that is substantially limiting the country’s ability to attract 
long-term foreign investment in the energy sector..101 
In their 2014 Investment Strategy, Arif Habib Limited stated: “Energy availability 
in Pakistan has been declining over the last few years, as a result of low investment in the 
sector. … Despite several measures taken by the government, prolonged and frequent 
power cuts have affected production activities and kept economic growth under [a] stiff 
grip from reaching its full potential.”102 Afia Malik has argued that the problem of 
circular debt could have been curbed right from the onset if cost effective electricity 
tariffs for consumers had been introduced early. She maintains that such a policy measure 
by the government would have suppressed the exponentially rising and thus 
unmanageable growth in domestic demand, and would have also been able to attract and 
maintain investment levels in the future. 103  The Pakistani government’s lack of 
professional and long-term management has increased levels of market and performance 
risks associated with investing in the energy in Pakistan for foreign investors, and has 
hence deterred foreign investors away from the country.104 
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However, when studying the correlation between government effectiveness and 
inflows of FDI in the Energy Sector between 2000 and 2014, a negative relationship is 
observed (Figure 5). FDI inflows seem to increase when government efficacy declines. 
One would expect that higher levels of government efficacy would correlate with 
higher levels of FDI inflows to the sector. However, several reasons might contribute to 
the opposite conclusion. Taimour Noorani argues that foreign investors have a greater 
incentive to invest in Pakistan’s energy sector when government effectiveness is low.105 
He argues that limited government efficacy creates opportunities for foreign investors to 
monetize from regulatory loopholes within a system that is corrupt and lacks cohesive 
checks and balances.106 Private producers inflate expenses incurred in setting up a power 
plant in order to state a higher per unit cost of energy in their Power Purchase 
                                                
105 Interview with Taimour Noorani (Senior Analyst for Principal Investments in Bank Al-Falah’s Merchant Banking 
Group) in discussion with the author, March 2016 
106 Ibid 
Figure 5: Correlation between Government Efficacy and FDI Inflows 
to Pakistan’s Energy Sector; Author’s calculations 
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Agreements. Due to limited resources, and sometimes vested interests, the government is 
often unable or unwilling to measure the true cost of energy provided by private power 
producers, allowing foreign investors to advantage from inefficacies within the system.  
 
4.3 Security and Inflows of FDI to Energy  
  
Two types of security threats, distinct in terms of location, primarily affect 
Pakistan. The first threat includes attacks in the mountainous and mostly rural areas of 
the country such as KP, North Waziristan, and the largely ungoverned territories of 
FATA. The second threat to security comes from attacks occurring in populated city 
centers. In either case, power production has historically remained unaffected since 
power production plants and distribution centers generally do not tend to be located in or 
near either of these sites. They are usually constructed in the outskirts of towns and cities. 
The security threat therefore, did not directly affect production or distribution 
patterns in the energy sector prior to 2008. As observed in Figure 6, FDI inflows to the 
energy sector continued to grow until 2008, even as the security situation in Pakistan 
worsened. Thus, on average, the relationship between security and FDI inflows is 
positive, which suggests that lower levels of security provision correlate with higher 
levels of FDI inflows to the energy sector. 
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 However, since 2009, the relationship has changed. The graph indicates that FDI 
inflows to the energy sector have begun to decline as security conditions worsen in 
Pakistan. It is likely that such a trend has started to emerge in recent years due to two 
reasons: One, it is possible that foreign investors have wanted to exit the market since 
before 2009 due to deteriorating security conditions, but were unable to do so due to the 
time needed to close or sell power plant investments. Two, security limitations have 
started to affect the energy sector more directly in recent years, as militants are beginning 
to attack power plants within the country in an attempt to disrupt the provision of power 
to the Pakistani population. In 2013, at least seven people were killed in an attack by 
dozens of militants on an electricity plant located on the outskirts of Peshawar.107 In 
January 2015, another attack by terrorists on power transmission lines in Balochistan 
                                                
107 Pakistan Attack: Deadly Raid on Peshawar Power Plant. BBC News, April 2, 2013. Accessed March 2016. 
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Figure 6: Correlation between Security and FDI Inflows to Pakistan’s 
Energy Sector; Author’s calculations 
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resulted in nearly 80% of the country facing a power blackout.108 Deteriorating security 
conditions in Pakistan have now started to affect power production and distribution 
directly, adding to the foreign investor’s risk considerations. As a result, foreign investors 
are likely to be deterred from investing Pakistan’s energy sector due to growing security 
concerns in the coming years. 
 
4.4 Global Investment Trends and Inflows of FDI to Energy 
 
In their 2013 Investment Report, KPMG, a Dutch financial services firm with an 
office in Pakistan wrote: “[The GoP] is providing an investment friendly environment for 
the oil and gas sector to attract local and foreign investment. As a result…this sector has 
emerged as one of the most attractive for investment in the country.”109 
Figure 7 presents a positive relationship between global inflows of FDI and 
inflows of FDI to the energy sector. As global inflows of FDI increase, there is a 
corresponding increase in FDI inflows to the energy sector in Pakistan. Such a trend 
likely has to do with Pakistan’s investment regime being a high-risk-high-return 
investment proposition.110  Foreign investors are more willing to absorb risk when the 
international economic climate is positive. Inflows of FDI to Pakistan’s energy sector 
were highest between 2006 and 2008, when global inflows of FDI were high as well. In 
2006, the government signed agreements worth USD 42 million with international 
companies to carry out exploration activities in the oil and gas sectors. Pipeline projects 
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were discussed and negotiated with several countries including Qatar, Turkmenistan, and 
Iran.111 These projects were long-term contracts that has allowed for the maintenance of 
stability in energy sector inflows even after national FDI inflows crashed. 
 
In 2015, domestic and foreign private producers controlled approximately 41.5% 
of total generation capacity, an increase from 30% in 2011.112 The USD 47 billion CPEC 
trade deal has put energy provision at the center of the government's agenda. The energy 
sector is arguably at a point where it has both, the need and the opportunity to transform. 
Creating a sustainable partnership with the private sector will allow the government to 
meet the growing energy demands of the country. 
 
                                                
111 Annual Report 2005-06, NEPRA. P. 5 
112 Rizvi, Jawwad. Demystifying Pakistan’s Energy Crisis. 2015. Accessed March 2016. 
http://www.technologyreview.pk/demystifying-pakistans-energy-crisis/; An Overview of Electricity Sector in Pakistan. 
Islamabad: Islamabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
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4.5 Assessing the Impact of Government Effectiveness, Security, and 
Global Investment Trends on FDI Inflows to the Energy Sector 
 
 
"Pakistan's problems are rooted in "shortages of governance than of pure supply 
[of power]," Michael Kugelman argues.113 Multiple factors have contributed to the 
current energy crisis in Pakistan. According to the United States Institute for Peace, there 
are three primary shortages affecting Pakistan’s energy sector: 1) Physical shortage: 
supply has not managed to keep pace with demand; 2) Financial Shortage: below cost 
tariffs and expensive subsidies have not been able to cover the cost of supply, resulting in 
repeated annual deficits; 3) Governance: government owned utilities and institutions have 
been unable to ensure commercial or regulatory discipline, resulting in sub-par energy 
provision and service.114 Ineffective governance has created budgetary problems such as 
circular debt, limiting the power sector’s capacity to expand especially. The issue was 
exacerbated after 2008, when foreign investors were faced with limited liquidity options, 
were unable and unwilling to take on significant investment risks. 
Since 2008, growing security concerns have increased the risk associated with 
investing in Pakistan’s energy sector. Limited government effectiveness and weak 
security provision has increased the risk associated with investing in Pakistan, and 
deterred significant growth in FDI inflows since 2008. As a result, Pakistan’s energy 
sector has been unable to attract long-term private sector investment. 
Pakistan’s energy sector requires large capital outlays, and is thus more affected 
by a slowdown in investments.115 United States Institute for Peace concludes that the 
shortfall in generation stems from a failure to achieve required investment that is 
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necessary to expand and maintain power generation, preventing the energy sector from 
developing new, cheaper, and more efficient production patterns.116 Afia Malik argues 
that in addition to building capital stock for power generation, investments must also 
focus on increasing capacity for electricity transmission and distribution to overcome the 
losses the sector has suffered.117 Unfortunately, controlling or restructuring companies 
that provide energy is challenging. 
At its core, FDI inflows to Pakistan’s energy sector are diluted due to inefficient 
governance, expensive tariff structures, a deteriorating security situation.118 Pakistan has 
the capacity to produce electricity on its own, but without streamlining the existing 
system, and accounting for commitments made to private investors, the government will 
be unable to maintain its strategy of promoting foreign investment as a means to finance 
growth within the energy sector. 
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The telecommunications sector plays an important role in the overall development 
of the Pakistani economy by providing core communication services that reduce 
transaction costs of doing business. 119  The availability of telecommunications 
infrastructure and services such as cellular towers, help centers and data centers is an 
integral tool that economies require to develop.120 
Since 2000, the telecommunications sector has been one of the fastest growing 
sectors in the Pakistani economy. Between 2001 and 2015, the sector has attracted USD 
7.2 billion in foreign direct investment. With a consumer base of over 121.13 million cell 
phone subscribers, 2.2 million broadband subscribers, and 30 million Internet users, the 
sector is ripe with opportunity for foreign investors.121 In their Investment Strategy 
Report, KMPG wrote of Pakistan as becoming the “destination of choice” for several 
international information and technology companies looking to relocate their operations 
offshore.122  
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However, FDI inflows to Pakistan’s telecommunications sector have declined 
significantly since 2008. This chapter studies the variations in inflows of FDI between 
2000 and 2014, analyzing the role of government efficiency, national security, and global 
investment levels on FDI inflows to the telecommunications sector in Pakistan. This 
chapter argues that the decline in government effectiveness and in security conditions 
since 2008 has diminished the attractiveness of Pakistan’s telecommunications sector as a 
viable investment destination for foreign investors. Section One of this chapter provides 
an overview of Pakistan’s telecommunications sector, and discusses how ownership of 
companies has shifted from the government to the sector. Sections two, three and four 
discuss the influence of government efficacy, national security, and global investment 
trends on inflows of FDI to the telecommunications sector. The final section of this 
chapter analyses the impact that each of these variables is likely to have on the ability of 
Pakistan’s telecommunications sector to attract FDI inflows in the future. 
 
5.1 An Overview of the Telecommunications Sector in Pakistan 
 
In 1947, the Post and Telegraph Department was all that existed of the 
Telecommunications sector. In 1962, the Department was separated into two distinct 
units: Pakistan Post Office Department and the Pakistan Telephone and Telegraph 
Department. The separation was motivated by the availability of new and cheaper 
communications technology, which incentivized the creation of an entity exclusively 
dedicated to expanding the telecommunications sector. In 1991, the Pakistan Telephone 
and Telegraph Department was renamed the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation 
(PTC). The PTC took over the functions and operations of its predecessor. The same 
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year, the Pakistan Telecommunications Corporation Act was signed. This Act illustrated 
the government’s focus towards encouraging private sector participation in the 
telecommunications sector. It served as the platform through which the Pakistani 
government announced its intention to privatize the PTC.123 By 1996 the PTC was 
restructured as a public limited company named Pakistan Telecommunication Company 
Limited (PTCL) listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange. The restructuring was part of the 
Pakistan Telecommunication Re-Organization Act of 1996 which mandated the 
formation of the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA). Although still a 
government agency, the PTA was structured as an independent regulator of the 
telecommunications sector, and was responsible for creating “a fair regulatory regime to 
promote investment, encourage competition, protect consumer interest and ensure high 
quality Information and Communication Technology (ICT) services.” 124  The PTA 
provided policy recommendations to the Pakistani government regarding improvements 
and changes required within the telecommunication sector, and implemented any policies 
pertaining to the telecommunications sector. 
In July 2003, the PTA announced the Deregulation Policy, which further open the 
telecommunications sector for local and foreign investors to provide better services at 
competitive prices.125 In 2004 the PTA introduced the Mobile Cellular Policy, liberalizing 
the cellular services sector in order to attract foreign investors as well.126 By March 2006, 
the Pakistani government had sold 26% of PTCL’s shares and transferred management 
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control to Etisalat—a U.A.E. based company. The privatization of PTCL effectively 
ended the Pakistani government’s monopoly over the telecommunications sector.  
By 2005-06, FDI inflows to the telecommunications sector had increased to USD 
1.94 billion, the highest annual inflow of FDI the sector has ever received (Figure 4).  
The exponential growth in FDI inflows to the telecommunications sector shortly after the 
introduction of the 2003 Deregulation Policy suggests that foreign investors were at least 
partially incentivized by the investment regime established within the sector. 
Besides a liberalized investment climate, the telecommunications sector also 
presented extensive growth opportunities for foreign investors. Teledensity, defined as 
the number of telephone connections for every hundred individuals living within an area, 
grew from 6.25 in 2003 to 44.06 in 2006 (Figure 8).127 Nearly seven million new 
connections were added on average in every quarter during the fiscal year 2006-07. 
 Given the favorable investment climate that emerged in 2003 due to a liberalized 
foreign investment regime and high market growth potential, the telecommunications 
sector attracted several foreign investments. Between 2006 and 2007, three deals were 
                                                
127 PTA figures 
Figure 8: Teledensity in Pakistan 2002 – 2014 
Source: PTA, Author’s Calculations 
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signed: First, Orascom Telecom, an Egyptian company with 88% stake in Mobilink, the 
largest cellular operator of Pakistan, acquired the remaining 11% stake in Mobilink from 
a local investor for USD 290 million.128 Second, Warid Telecomm, a U.A.E. based 
company, finalized a deal with Singtel, which acquired a 30% stake in Warid Telecom 
for USD 758 million.129 Third, CM-PAK of China Mobile injected USD 700 million in 
Pakistan’s telecommunications sector, focusing primarily on expanding its network in 
rural areas. This deal was part of a larger USD 2 billion investment plan for the next three 
years, with all financing coming from China.130 
 However, by 2008-09 FDI inflows to the telecommunications sector fell sharply, 
and have not been able to recover since (Figure 4). The decline in inflows of FDI to the 
telecommunications sector mirrors the decline in FDI inflows to the Pakistani economy. 
According to the Ministry of Finance in Pakistan, the Pakistani economy faced a series of 
unexpected and severe shocks during 2008-09. Negative shock came from severe 
macroeconomic crises that cause several policy-induced imbalances, reducing the amount 
of foreign capital available to finance and invest in the economy.131 
The sudden reversal in growth of FDI inflows to the telecommunications sector is 
still surprising, especially given that teledensity grew consistently until 2013, indicating 
the continued presence of strong growth opportunities (Figure 8). The fact that 
telecommunications was unable to recover FDI inflows after the global crash of 2008, 
suggests that growth was not exclusively limited by a decline in international investment 
                                                
128 Inam, Asif. 2007. Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan's Telecommunications Sector: Pakistan Telecommunication 
Authority. P. 23. Accessed January 2016. https://www.itu.int/ITU-D/finance/work-cost-tariffs/events/tariff-
seminars/Korea-07/presentations/FDI_Aasif_Inam.pdf 
129 Ibid. P. 23 
130 Ibid. P. 24 
131 Hameed, Sadika. 2014. Opportunities in the Development of Pakistan's Private Sector: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies. P. 79. Accessed October 2015. 
http://csis.org/files/publication/140917_Hameed_PakistanPrivateSector_Web.pdf 
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levels. The following sections of this chapter examine the effects of government efficacy, 
national security, and global investment on inflows of FDI to the telecommunications 
sector between 2000 and 2014. 
 
5.2 Government Effectiveness and Inflows of FDI to 
Telecommunications 
 
The Pakistani telecommunications sector presents itself as a unique sectoral case 
study: the sector is almost entirely privatized and de-regulated, but is still monitored by 
the PTA. Following the 2003 Deregulation Policy, the PTA has been responsible for 
implementing and enforcing policies created by the Pakistani government. Private 
investors are allowed to own a 100% of equity, offered an initial depreciation allowance 
of 50% of plant, machinery and equipment cost, and charged only 0-5% percent customs 
duty on imports of plant, machinery, and equipment related to the telecommunications 
sector.132 Additionally, the PTA allows telecommunication companies to independently 
determine pricing structures. This allows investors to price products in a way that allows 
them to cover costs and compete with other companies in the sector. Unlike the complex 
tariff structure existent in the Pakistani Energy sector, independent pricing generates low 
political pressures and has well mapped risk and risk mitigation strategies, creating a 
friendly investment climate for private foreign investors. 
Effective governance and policy implementation incentivizes foreign investors to 
invest in the telecommunications sector in Pakistan. Figure 9 presents a positive 
relationship between government effectiveness and FDI inflows to telecommunications. 
                                                
132 Harianawala, Shabbir and Owais Aziz. Pakistan Telecom Sector Overview. Haidermota BNR. Accessed February 
2016. http://www.hmcobnr.com/includes/Telecom%20Sector%20Overview.pdf 
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Higher levels of government efficacy correlate with higher levels of FDI inflows. The 
graph also presents the cluster of years between 2009 and 2014 in the bottom left hand 
corner, which indicates that the lowest levels of FDI inflows to the telecommunications 
sector were experienced when government effectiveness was also at its lowest. 
 
The transition to a weak democratic regime in 2007-08 resulted in the instatement 
of a government that has paid little attention to encouraging foreign investors to invest in 
the telecommunications sector. National elections in 2013 postponed the rollout of 3G 
cellular data service options. Such delays have weakened the quality of policy 
implementation and government efficacy in the telecommunications sector, and thus 
increased the perceived level of risk and uncertainty associated with investing in the 
telecommunications sector.133  
                                                
133 3G is the third generation of mobile telecommunications technology. This is based on a set of standards used for 
mobile devices and mobile telecommunications use services and networks that comply with the International Mobile 
Telecommunications-2000 specifications by the International Telecommunication Union 
Figure 9: Correlation between Governance and FDI Inflows to 
Pakistan’s Telecommunication Sector; Author’s calculations 
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Additionally, even though the telecommunications sector offers one of the most 
liberalized investment policies, tax rates within the sector are some of the highest in the 
world. The telecommunications sector in Pakistan is charged a corporate tax rate of 
34%.134 The Pakistani government has also increased tax rates for consumers. In 2014, 
cellular subscribers were paying 19.5% GST, 15% withholding tax, and up to 8% of 
service charges on telecommunication services.135  Such a tax structure disproportionately 
affects low-income communities that are no longer able to afford services that cellular 
services provide. The inability of the telecommunications sector to provide low-income 
groups—a sizeable market in Pakistan—with access to communication services reduces 
growth opportunities available to the sector in Pakistan. Thus as the risks associated with 
government effectiveness have increased, the incentives offered to foreign investors have 
declined, thereby reducing the attractiveness of Pakistan’s telecommunications sector as a 
lucrative investment decision. 
 
5.3 Security and Inflows of FDI to Telecommunications  
 
The first time that the provision of security and the provision of 
telecommunication services were in conflict with each other was in 2004, when a bomb 
disposal squad found mobile phone technology used to detonate a bomb in Karachi.136 
Since then mobile phone controlled devices have often been used to detonate bombs 
                                                
134 Pomerleau, Kyle. 2014. Corporate Income Tax Rates Around the World, 2014: Tax Foundation. Accessed March 
2016. http://taxfoundation.org/sites/default/files/docs/FF436_0.pdf 
135 GST: Goods and services tax; Baloch, Farooq. Budget 2014-15: Giving Relief to the Telecom Sector. The Express 
Tribune, June 3, 2014. Accessed March 2016. http://tribune.com.pk/story/716958/budget-2013-14-giving-relief-to-the-
telecom-sector/ 
136 Khan, Faraz. Ban on cellular service: Police fear terrorists may use other means besides cellphones. The Express 
Tribune, November 22, 2012. Accessed March 2016. http://tribune.com.pk/story/469406/ban-on-cellular-service-
police-fear-terrorists-may-use-other-means-besides-cellphones/; accessed april 1 2016 
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during processions and political rallies. Cellular phones were used again in 2010 to 
detonate bombs during processions held on the 8th, 9th and 10th of Muharram.137 While 
cases of shutting down cellular services were heard of as early as 2005 when cellular 
service in certain areas of Balochistan was restricted due to ongoing military operations, 
the government has started applying this strategy in most parts of the country, and at a 
wide range of events including religious or national holidays, protests, and marches.138 A 
report published by the Institute for Human Rights and Business in 2015 writes: 
 
“Telecommunication operators often bear the responsibility of executing 
government orders to shutdown communications, whether mobile 
networks in particular cities or regions, Internet access, or access to 
particular websites or messaging applications. The request process may be 
unclear, execution is technically complex, and there is in most cases 
virtually no transparency. In addition, it is still a difficult topic for 
companies to discuss publicly, due to the national security element.”139 
  
 The increased frequency in cellular service shut downs has made it challenging 
for telecommunication operators to provide quality service to their customers and 
simultaneously cooperate with security agencies.140 Deteriorating security conditions are 
affecting the work environment, and are influencing the decline in FDI inflows to the 
telecommunications sector in Pakistan. As observed in Figure 10, inflows of FDI to the 
telecommunications sector have dropped with a decline in security in the country. 
                                                
137 Ibid. 
Muharram is the first month of the Muslim Calendar. It is mostly observed by Shia’a Muslims who mourn the 
martyrdom of Imam Hussain, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad in the Battle of Karbala. Imam Hussain was 
martyred on the 10th of Muharram. 
138 Purdon, Lucy (ed.). Security v. Access: The Impact of Mobile Network Shutdowns. Institute for Human Rights and 
Business. P. 17. Accessed April 1, 2016. https://content.bytesforall.pk/sites/default/files/2015-09-Telenor-Pakistan-
Case-Study.pdf 




 In 2014, the National Action Plan introduced by the government to increase 
security provision affected the telecommunications. The National Action Plan required 
the PTA to plan, implement, and monitor the biometric re-verification of cellular SIM 
cards.141 While this drive has created a reliable and necessary database, it has caused a 
drop in teledensity for the first time since 2000. Teledensity dropped to 61.8% at the end 
of fiscal year 2015, from 79.6% in 2014. Further, the rollout of 3G and 4G cellular data 
services received less attention due to total priority being placed on the re-verification 
drive. Thus far, the provision of national security has been incompatible with the interests 
                                                
141 In 2014, the Pakistani government launched a campaign requiring all cellular SIM cards—microchips that store the 
cellular phone’s number—to be re-registered under the owner’s name. The owner’s biometrics (fingerprints) were also 
taken, re-verified, and then matched to the cellular number. This information was then tallied and synced against the 
individual’s National Identity Card. While all new cellular numbers are verified through this process, older phones still 
needed to be checked. Numbers that could not be matched or identified against the owner’s information were 
disconnected. The motivation behind this strategy was to control deteriorating security conditions, limit the ease with 
which terrorists could access a cellular phone and number, and allow the government, army and intelligence units to 
trace numbers to suspects of terrorist activities. 
According to the 2014 Investment Report by Arif Habib Bank, a total of 215.4 million cellular SIM cards were re-
verified under this drive, out of which 114.9 million cellular SIM cards were identified as belonging to their rightful 
owners, while 98.3 million cellular SIM cards—including 26.7 million active cellular SIM cards—were blocked 
because ownership was inaccurately listed, or could not be verified. (Arif Habib Limited. 2014. Pakistan Strategy 
2014: 2014 Unfolds another Chapter of a Growth Story! P. 9) 
Figure 10: Correlation between Security and FDI Inflows to 
Pakistan’s Telecommunication Sector; Author’s calculations 
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of the telecommunications sector in Pakistan, and has increased the uncertainty 
associated with investing in the sector. The consequences of providing higher levels of 
security have resulted in the deterrence of FDI inflows to the telecommunications sector 
in Pakistan. 
 
5.4 Global Investment Trends and Inflows of FDI to 
Telecommunications  
 
Liberalization of the telecommunications sector in the early 2000’s contributed to 
an increase in levels of FDI to the sector. Immediate increases in inflows of FDI were 
observed following the implementation of the 2003 Deregulation Policy. The policy was 
created at a time that global inflows of FDI were rising. Until 2007, the relationship 
between global investment levels and inflows of FDI to the telecommunications sector 
remained positive, illustrating that higher levels of global investment correlated with 
higher levels of FDI inflows to the telecommunications sector (Figure 11). 
Figure 11: Correlation between Security and FDI Inflows to 
Pakistan’s Telecommunication Sector; Author’s calculations 
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It is possible that the telecommunications sector received higher levels of FDI 
inflows between 2000 and 2007 due to rising global investment. However, in the years 
between 2009 and 2014, global investment has remained high, while inflows of FDI to 
telecommunications have declined. Since 2010, the telecommunications sector has been 
receiving close to zero or negative inflows of FDI. Inflows of FDI to the 
telecommunications sector are moving away from the country at a time when there is a 
favorable international climate for attracting FDI inflows. Such a trend suggests that the 
decline in government effectiveness and the growing cost of security measures has 
increased the risk associated with investing in Pakistan’s telecommunications sector.  
In 2013, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif promised a more “business friendly” 
agenda.142 He has sought to refocus attention on Pakistan’s market potential through 
closer cooperation with foreign businesses and countries. Such an effort might allow for 
the telecommunications sector to re-attract more inflows of FDI in the upcoming years, 
making the sector a competitive and attractive investment opportunity once again.  
 
5.5 Assessing the Impact of Government Effectiveness, Security, and 
Global Investment Trends on FDI Inflows to the Energy Sector 
 
At the end of fiscal year 2014-2015, there were five major market players 
operating within Pakistan’s telecommunications sector, each of which was entirely or 
partially owned by a foreign investor.143 As a result growth in FDI inflows directly affects 
growth in Pakistan’s telecommunications sector. 
                                                
142 Purdon, Lucy (ed.). Security v. Access: The Impact of Mobile Network Shutdowns. P. 17 
143 Moblink (29.2% market share), Telenor (27.5% market share), CMPak (19.3% market share), Ufone (15.5% market 
share) and Warid (8.6%). (PTA Report 2014 – 15) 
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Between 2000 and 2014, the Pakistani telecommunications sector has experienced 
drastic changes in the levels of inflows of FDI. This inconsistency has partially been 
caused due to weakening government efficacy, which has led to a decline in policy 
enforcement, and the creation a highly exploitative tax regime. Increased government 
interference in the telecommunications sector through policies such as the National 
Action Plan have disrupted the capacity of companies operating within the 
telecommunications sector to provide consistent service. Weakened government 
effectiveness, and a decline in national security have contributed to outflows of FDI from 
Pakistan’s telecommunications sector. 
 Today, while most urban areas are almost entirely connected to a grid, there are 
several rural areas that remain untouched. In order to access capital and technology 
necessary to develop a strong telecommunications market in rural areas, it is important 
for the government to develop partnerships with foreign companies in order to boost FDI 
inflows to the telecom sector. In doing so, the government also opens up the possibilities 
of developing rural areas through telecommunications; for instance, through the 
expansion of branchless mobile banking services such as Easy Paisa which allow for 
families in rural areas to access capital far more easily within their own communities. 
The telecommunications sector has been able to benefit significantly from foreign 
direct investment, be that through access to capital, development of human capital, and 
overall economic growth and development. It is a sector that holds tremendous 
opportunity, and continuing to develop that opportunity will not only be instrumental for 










In an essay published in 2005 Dr. Ishrat Husain, former governor of the SBP 
wrote: “No economy can grow and improve the living standards of its population in the 
absence of a well functioning and efficient financial sector.”144 He argued that economic 
development Pakistan is inter-related with the development of its financial services 
sector. It is argued that a well-developed financial services sector is a pre-condition for 
attracting FDI.145 A strong financial system provides a more conducive investment 
climate in two ways: First it mobilizes savings, which increases the amount of resources 
available to finance investments. Second it monitors and facilitates investment projects, 
lowering acquisition costs and increasing the efficiency of on-going projects.146 The 
strength of a country’s financial services sector is positively correlated with investor 
confidence regarding the capacity of investments to generate competitive rates of return.  
The advancement of the financial services sector is crucial to the overall 
development of the Pakistani economy and its capacity to attract long-term and 
sustainable sources of FDI. Stability within the financial sector reduces the risk involved 
                                                
144 Husain, Ishrat. Banking Sector Reforms in Pakistan. Blue Chip – The Business People’s Magazine. January 2005. 
Accessed April 1, 2016. http://www.bis.org/review/r050203e.pdf 
145 Arshad Khan, Muhammad. Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: The Role of the Domestic Financial 
Sector. PIDE Working Papers. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics. P. 24. Accessed November 
2016. http://130.56.61.71/sites/default/files/documents/PIDE_Khan_2007_05.pdf 
146 Ibid. P. 14 
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in financial transactions, lowers the cost of financial intermediation, and optimizes the 
allocation of resources available in the economy.147 Additionally the development of 
Pakistan’s financial system determines the ease with which firms are able to borrow and 
access capital from financial institutions.148  
Since the privatization of major domestic banks in Pakistan during the 1990’s, the 
financial services sector has expanded in size and become more competitive.149 Relatively 
improved management as compared to the 1970’s has increased profitability and reduced 
the number of non-performing loans.150 Yet opportunities within the field remain largely 
unexploited. In 2014 only 13% of Pakistan’s adult population had individual or shared 
accounts at formal financial institutions.151 The Pakistani population’s limited access to 
financial services is an indicator of the lack of development in financial services and the 
availability of growth opportunities for foreign investors.  
This chapter argues that weak government effectiveness and poor security 
conditions have contributed to limited development of the financial services sector in 
Pakistan. The first section provides an overview of the financial services sector in 
Pakistan. The next three sections discuss the effects of government efficacy, security and 
global inflows of FDI on inflows of financial services in Pakistan respectively. The final 
section of this chapter discusses the role that the Pakistani government can play in the 
future in order to improve and encourage FDI inflows to the financial services sector in 
Pakistan.  
                                                
147 State Bank of Pakistan. 2005. Pakistan Financial Sector Assessment: Chapter 8 (Financial Sector Development). P. 
145. Accessed February 2016. http://www.sbp.org.pk/publications/FSA/2005/  
148 Arshad Khan, Muhammad. Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: The Role of the Domestic Financial 
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149 Banks had been nationalized in the 1970’s 
150 State Bank of Pakistan. 2009. Pakistan 10 Year Strategy Paper for Banking Sector Reforms. P. 3. Accessed March 
2016. http://www.sbp.org.pk/bsd/10YearStrategyPaper.pdf 
151 World Bank. Financial Inclusion Data/Global Findex. Accessed April 2016. 
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6.1 An Overview of the Financial Services Sector in Pakistan 
 
Prior to the early 1970’s the financial sector in Pakistan comprised of a mixture of 
public and private banks. In the early 1970’s Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then Prime Minister of 
Pakistan, pursued an aggressive nationalization policy. Private domestic banks were 
nationalized and the role of public sector development finance institutions was 
expanded.152 Government-owned financial institutions dominated the financial services 
sector in Pakistan.153 However, by the end of the 1980’s it became apparent that the 
socio-economic development objectives had not been achieved by nationalization 
policies. Assessing the financial sector that existed towards the end of the 1980s, the 
State Bank of Pakistan concluded: 
“The pre-dominance of [the] public sector in banking and non-bank 
financial institutions, coupled with the instruments of direct monetary 
control, were becoming increasingly responsible for financial inefficiency, 
crowding out of the private sector, deteriorating the quality of assets and 
rising vulnerability of financial institutions.”154 
 
By the early 1990’s a number of amendments were made to the State Bank of 
Pakistan Act of 1956 and the Banks (Nationalization) Act of 1974.155 The objective was 
to encourage privatization of Non-Commercial Banks, enhance competition in financial 
services by allowing the private sector to establish new banks, increase autonomy of the 
SBP in formulating and implementing monetary policy, and consolidate the role of the 
SBP as a regulator of banks and non-bank financial institutions.156 In 1991 the private 
                                                
152 State Bank of Pakistan. 2000. Financial Sector Assessment 1990-2000: Executive Summary. P. 1. Accessed March 
2016. http://www.sbp.org.pk/publications/fsa/ 
153 Ahmad, Usman, Shujaat Farooq, and Hafiz Hanzla Jalil. 2009. Efficiency Dynamics and Financial Reforms: Case 
Study of Pakistani Banks. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics (25): 173-181. P. 173. 
154 State Bank of Pakistan. 2000. Financial Sector Assessment 1990-2000: Executive Summary 
155 State Bank of Pakistan. 2000. Financial Sector Assessment 1990-2000: Chapter 2 (Financial Sector Reforms During 
1990s). P. 3.  
156 Ibid. 
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ownership of banks was permitted. The government liberalized investment policies in 
order to attract foreign and domestic private sector investors towards Pakistan’s financial 
services sector. Ten new private banks were authorized to operate in 1991. Market share 
of private domestic and foreign banks increased from 7% in 1990 to 44% in 2000.157 
By 2000, Pakistan’s investment policy provided complete freedom of investment 
to foreign investors investing in the financial services sector. The State Bank of Pakistan 
(SBP) only required foreign investors to register all FDI inflows with the bank. 
Otherwise, foreign investors were free to repatriate profits and dividends, and dis-invest 
from the country at any point without prior approval from the SBP.158 
In 2014 the financial services sector in Pakistan consisted of thirty-eight 
Commercial Banks, ten Microfinance Banks, and eight Development Finance 
Institutions. Domestic private banks held approximately 78% of total assets of the 
banking system, while public sector and foreign banks held a 20% and 2% share in total 
assets respectively.159 FDI inflows to the financial services sector have closely matched 
national FDI inflow trends. Inflows remain minimal until 2005-06, after which they rise 
sharply for the next two years (Figure 4). Inflows of FDI to the financial services sector 
surpass those going to the telecommunications sector in 2007-08. However, the financial 
services sector was unable to revitalize inflows of FDI after 2008. The next three sections 
of this chapter assess the ways in which government effectiveness, security, and global 
investment levels have affected FDI inflows to the financial services sector. In doing so, 
                                                
157 Burki, Abid A. and Niazi, G.S.K. Impact of Financial Reforms on Efficiency of State-Owned, Private and Foreign 
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this section studies the causes behind weak inflows to the financial services sector pre-
2006 and post-2008. 
 
6.2 Government Effectiveness and Inflows of FDI to Financial Services 
 
Until the end of the 1980’s, public sector financial institutions held the bulk of 
assets, deposits, and investments of Pakistan’s financial sector.160 High government 
borrowing, bank-by-bank credit ceilings, interest rate controls, and subsidized credit 
characterized Pakistan’s financial system.161 The system required excessive government 
monitoring, management and supervision, making it very ineffective. The financial 
structure was not conducive for meeting the growing financial needs of the economy. 
 Thus, the government implemented broad-based reforms in order to liberalize the 
financial services sector in the 1990’s. Private banks were allowed to operate and 
compete with publicly owned commercial banks. These reforms were focused towards 
attracting FDI into the economy.162 By the end of 1991, the International Finance 
Corporation ranked Pakistan as one of the leading emerging markets in the world.163 
 The Musharraf government continued to liberalize Pakistan’s financial services 
sector. The Administration chose to not keep banks under government ownership and 
control, and decided to privatize and consolidate them instead. The government injected 
30.7 billion rupees into the financial services sector to offset the losses incurred by 
                                                
160 State Bank of Pakistan. 2000. Financial Sector Assessment 1990-2000: Chapter 1 (Pre-Reform Structure in 1990) 
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nationalized commercial banks and to recapitalize them.164 Such an initiative helped to 
increase trust in government effectiveness and boost investor confidence in the financial 
services sector. Additionally, during the Musharraf government, professional bankers 
were appointed as Chief Executives, while experienced and reputable businessmen were 
invited to join the Board of Directors. Shaukat Aziz, Minister of Finance from October 
1999 till November 2007, was appointed as Prime Minister as well in 2004. According to 
Majid Munir, Mr. Aziz was “the right man doing the right job.”165 A professional 
economist and financer, Mr. Aziz understood the nuances of the Pakistani economy. His 
efforts to maintain cordial and friendly relationships with major trading and investor 
countries allowed for Pakistan to be seen in a positive light within the international 
investment community. By establishing a balance between freedom and oversight in the 
financial services sector, the government created a positive investment climate attractive 
to foreign investors. 
 The system quickly unraveled after 2008, when Asif Zardari was elected president 
of Pakistan. At this time the weakened global economic climate demanded an effective 
government in Pakistan. The fragile democratic government’s inability to provide 
effective governance and direction at a time of economic despair resulted in the departure 
of several foreign banks form Pakistan. HSBC, ABN-AMRO, and the Royal Bank of 
Scotland all closed up operations between 2008 and 2013.166 Foreign banks that stayed 
reduced operations: The American owned Citibank downsized from fifteen branches in 
                                                
164 Husain, Ishrat. Banking Sector Reforms in Pakistan	  
165 Majid Munir in discussion with the author, February 2016 
166 HSBC sells Pakistan arm. The Telegraph. September 10, 2012. Accessed April 2016. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9533856/HSBC-sells-Pakistan-arm.html; RBS to 
sell off its Pakistan bank. BBC News. Accessed April 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/10133868 
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Pakistan, to three branches only, between 2008 and 2010.167 Credit Suisse, a Swiss bank 
closed operations in Pakistan after 2008, even though they still had an active operating 
license.168  
 Ineffective governance under the Zardari presidency also contributed to the 
expansion of Pakistan’s informal economy. The difficulty of accurately accounting for 
jobs and income generated through the informal economy resulted in a lot of economic 
activity being hidden from the analysis regarding Pakistan’s market potential. The 
inability of the Pakistani government to transfer operations of the informal economy into 
the formal economy resulted in an under-representation of domestic economic 
performance. Weak government effectiveness thus led to the underweighting of 
economic opportunity and the overweighting of investment risks by foreign investors. 
This perception deterred FDI inflows to the financial services sector in Pakistan.169 
                                                
167 Majid Munir in discussion with the author, February 2016 
168 Ibid. 
169 The informal economy is the diversified set of economic activities, enterprises, jobs, and workers that are not 
regulated or protected by the state. The concept originally applied to self-employment in small, unregistered 
enterprises. It has been expanded to include wage employment in unprotected jobs. 
Figure 12: Correlation between Government Effectiveness of FDI and 
FDI Inflows to Pakistan’s Financial Services Sector; Author’s 
calculations 
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Between 2000 and 2014, financial services in Pakistan has benefitted from higher 
levels of government effectiveness. A more effective government is likely to attract 
higher inflows of FDI to the financial services sector. This intuition aligns with the 
relationship observed in Figure 12: higher levels of FDI to the financial services sector in 
Pakistan correlate with better government effectiveness.  
 There are two main clusters of years in the bottom half of Figure 10. The one on 
the right includes years from 2002 till 2005, while the cluster on the left includes years 
from 2008-2014. Both clusters have similar levels of inflows of FDI to the financial 
services sector. However, governance is far more effective between 2000 and 2005, as 
compared to 2008 till 2014. This discrepancy suggests that while government efficacy is 
important to attracting FDI to the financial services sector in Pakistan, it is not 
exclusively contributing to inclines and declines of FDI inflows to the sector either.  
   
6.3 Security and Inflows of FDI to Financial Services 
 
 Karachi is the financial and commercial hub of Pakistan. It is also a city that has 
been experiencing high levels of security crises such as terrorist attacks and grave 
political instability. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 was carried 
out on Shahre-Faisal, the financial vein of the city. The concentration of financial 
services in a highly insecure city has deterred foreign investors from investing in 
Pakistan.170 According to the Economic Survey of Pakistan, the economic loss due to 
incidents of terrorism is USD 106.98 billion. Annual economic losses started to increase 
steadily in 2007, and peaked in 2011. 
                                                
170 Pratima Singh (Senior Analyst at Frontier Strategy Group) in discussion with the author, January 2016 
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Limited security provision has most directly started to affect small and medium 
size enterprises (SMEs) in Pakistan. The poor security situation has resulted in the 
repeated closure of small businesses due to “unexpected holidays” that are announced by 
the government due to bomb blasts, strikes organized by political parties, and riots. The 
inability of small businesses to generate adequate revenue directly affects their capacity 
to service debt. 171  Given that SMEs constitute nearly 90% of all enterprises in Pakistan, 
their inability to perform due to security concerns significantly affects economic growth 
prospects in Pakistan.172 These concerns are factored into the analysis of foreign financial 
institutions that would much rather invest in a lower risk investment opportunity. 
 However, the data on the relationship between security and FDI inflows to the 
financials sector is fairly ambiguous (Figure 13). A weak positive relationship between 
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Figure 13: Correlation between Security and FDI Inflows to 
Pakistan’s Financial Services Sector; Author’s calculations 
 86 
security and inflows of FDI to the financial services sector exists, which indicates that 
FDI to the financial services sector in Pakistan has been low when security provision has 
been weak within the country. However, the correlation has become more significant 
since 2009. The cluster of years in the bottom right of Figure 13 indicates that lower 
levels of security provision have strongly correlated with low levels of FDI in the 
financial services sector between 2009 and 2014. The trend suggests that security risks 
have likely become more of a concern for foreign investors since 2008, and have deterred 
FDI inflows to the financial services sector. 
 
6.4 Global Investment Trends and Inflows of FDI to Financial Services 
 
 Foreign investors are mainly attracted by strong economic fundamentals in host 
economies.173 These include market size, level of real income and possibilities for the 
expansion of business activities. However, structural weaknesses in Pakistan’s economy, 
such as power shortages that lead to an underutilization of industrial capacity, rising costs 
of production, circular debt, and trends in the decline in FDI, reinforce the perception that 
Pakistan is not a viable place for FDI.174  
 In many ways, the financial services sector serves as a mediator and facilitator of 
FDI inflows being injected into the rest of the economy. Trends in the national economy 
serve as a magnified mirror for trends observed in the financial services sector. Higher 
levels of FDI inflows to Pakistan indicate correspondingly high levels of FDI inflows to 
the financial services sector. As a result, factors limiting inflows of FDI to the national 
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economy, such as poor government efficacy and weak security provision will invariably 
affect and constrain the performance of the financial services sector.  
 
 The relationship is observed in Figure 14a and 14b. The relationship between 
global inflows of FDI to Pakistan, and global inflows of FDI to Pakistan’s financial 
services sector is almost entirely the same. Thus, in order to understand the factors 
limiting inflows of FDI to the financial services sector in periods of economic growth, it 
is necessary to understand the factors restricting inflows of FDI to the Pakistani economy 
at large. This thesis has argued that weakening government efficacy and declining 
security provision has increased the risk associated with investing in Pakistan. Poor 
governance and security is therefore going to deter foreign investors away from 
Pakistan’s financial services sector as well. 
 
 
Figure 14b: Correlation between Global Inflows of FDI 
and FDI Inflows to Pakistan’s Financial Services Sector; 
Author’s calculations 
Figure 14a: Correlation between Global Inflows of FDI 
and FDI Inflows to Pakistan; Author’s calculations 
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6.5 Assessing the Impact of Government Effectiveness, Security, and 
Global Investment Trends on FDI Inflows to the Energy Sector 
 
Financial markets affect both the financing of investment and day-to-day business 
activities.175 Well-developed financial markets encourage entrepreneurial activities and 
output, encouraging a positive feedback effect on FDI inflows to the financial services 
sector, and then to other sectors in the country.  
Since 2008, perceived levels uncertainty associated with investing in Pakistan 
have increased. The simultaneous weakening of governance in Pakistan, decline in 
domestic security, and crash of the international financial system contributed to the sharp 
decline in inflows of FDI to Pakistan, and thus, to Pakistan’s financial services sector. 
Continued government inefficacy and security deterioration has resulted in Pakistan’s 
inability to gain fully from growth in global investment since 2009.  
 If the Pakistani government is to boost national FDI inflows, it must work towards 
strengthening the nation’s financial services sector in order to boost Pakistan’s image as a 
viable destination for foreign investors. There is a need for effective leadership in the 
State Bank of Pakistan that can increase the ease with which foreign investors can invest 
in Pakistan. The government must also focus on expanding the role of the formal 
economy, and increase security provisions, particularly in Karachi. If they are to increase 
FDI inflows to Pakistan, the Pakistani government must reduce risk and uncertainty 
perceptions regarding the investment climate in Pakistan. Working towards this goal by 
strengthening the country’s financial services sector allows for the country to 
sustainability achieve this goal.  
                                                










Foreign Direct Investment has become an integral part of the effort to create an 
open international economic system, and is considered a key provider of capital and 
advanced technology in developing countries. Maintaining a consistent partnership with 
the foreign private sector, allows developing economies to stimulate economic growth 
and development independent of solely relying on foreign assistance. 
Since the 1990’s, several developing countries have liberalized their economies in 
order to incentivize foreign investors, and have succeeded in attracting substantial 
amounts of FDI.176 The Pakistani experience, however, has been different. In spite of 
offering one of the most liberal foreign investment regimes in Asia, Pakistan has been 
unable to attract or maintain substantial inflows of FDI since 2008. Motivated by this 
puzzle, this thesis examined and assessed the internal and external factors affecting the 
inclines and declines in FDI inflows to Pakistan between 2000 and 2014. Undertaking a 
comparative sectoral analysis, this study compared the effects of government 
effectiveness, national security, and global investment trends on FDI inflows to three 
sectors in Pakistan: Energy, Telecommunications and Financial Services. This study has 
argued that declining government effectiveness and poor national security provision has 
contributed to an increase in perceived levels of risk and uncertainty associated with 
                                                
176 Khan H., Ashfaque and Yun-Hwan Kim. 1999. Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan: Policy Issues and 
Operational Implications, p. 33 
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investing in Pakistan. This thesis has demonstrated that Pakistan’s capacity to attract 
desirable levels of FDI inflows was diminished after 2008. Foreign investors were more 
unwilling to pursue high-risk, high-return investment opportunities such as those offered 
in Pakistan during a global financial crisis. 
 This study began by providing a brief overview of international development 
models that have existed since the 1950’s. By examining the evolving role of government 
and the private sector in international development efforts, this thesis discussed the 
growing importance of finding a sustainable partnership between these two actors in the 
post-2015 development agenda. Having established the need for cooperation between the 
public and private sector, this thesis discussed the particular role of FDI as a provider of 
development finance and a driver of economic growth and development. The study then 
introduced Pakistan as an important case study, and offered an overview of the country’s 
relationship with FDI since the 1970’s. The historical analysis reviewed the Pakistani 
government’s stance regarding private sector involvement in the domestic economy, and 
discussed the ways in which economic policies have evolved from widespread 
nationalization towards liberalization and privatization. This study argued that the active 
effort by the Pakistani government to encourage FDI inflows in the 1990’s was indicative 
of the nation’s realization of FDI’s role as a driver of economic growth and development. 
Having established the reasons behind the Pakistani government’s pursuit of economic 
liberalization, the study examined the factors affecting limited inflows of FDI to the 
country since 2008. By analyzing the trends in FDI inflows to the Energy, 
Telecommunications, and Financial Services sectors between 2000 and 2014, this study 
discussed the ways in which government efficacy, national security, and global inflows of 
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FDI promoted or limited the provision of an environment conducive to foreign investors 
in Pakistan. Each of the sectors had different relationships with the three independent 
variables, which indicated that the extent to which FDI inflows were affected by 
government efficacy, security, and global investment was unique to each sector.  
This research has established that the liberalization of Pakistan’s FDI regime has 
not served as an adequate or sufficient strategy for attracting higher inflows of FDI in the 
country. Between 2000 and 2014, FDI inflows to Pakistan were extremely variable, 
resulting in unbalanced economic growth and development. 177  If the Pakistani 
government is to pursue economic development through foreign private sector 
involvement, it will need to offer more consistent policies to foreign investors, and focus 
on the long-term implications of policy creation and implementation.178 In addition to 
offering attractive policies, the Pakistani government must also focus on altering 
perceptions that foreign investors hold regarding the risk associated with investing in 
Pakistan. The government should identify methods of improving Pakistan’s image as a 
viable and opportune host country by providing more effective policy enforcement 
mechanisms, offering infrastructure facilities and ensuring higher levels of national 
security.179  
The Pakistani government must also work towards revising, introducing and 
implementing policies particular to each sector. In the case of the Energy sector in 
Pakistan, the government must revisit the tariff and subsidy framework, and restructure 
current pricing strategies in order to reduce the costs associated with private power 
                                                
177 Interview with Shaista Khilji (Professor of Human and Organizational Learning at the George Washington 
University’s Graduate School of Education and Human Development) in discussion with the author, March 2016 
178 Ibid; Majid Munir in discussion with the author, February 2016 
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production in the country. There is also a need to improve power generation and 
distribution facilities in the country. Within the telecommunications sector, the 
government must identify ways to partner with private companies regarding issues 
pertaining to national security provision, and reexamine the tax structure currently 
imposed on consumers of telecommunication services. Within Financial Services, the 
government should pursue strategies that improve Pakistan’s image as a viable 
investment destination, thus incentivizing foreign banks to continue operations within the 
country. Within each of the sectors, the Pakistani government must consistently work 
towards developing long-term partnerships with foreign investors that align with the 
vision of the Post-2015 Development agenda, and further economic growth and 
development opportunities within the country. 
It can be argued that the Pakistani government has started to move in this 
direction. The Board of Investment’s Foreign Direct Investment Strategy 2013-2017 
recognizes the limitations and risks associated with investing in Pakistan. The Report 
primarily focuses on marketing strategies that will improve Pakistan’s image as a 
destination country for FDI. Additionally, the signing of the USD 46 billion CPEC trade 
deal between China and Pakistan will increase infrastructure facilities available in the 
country, particularly in energy, telecommunications and transportation. The trade deal is 
representative of the establishment of a long-term partnership that will further 
technological capacity, reduce the gap between investment and savings, and contribute to 
long-term economic advancement in Pakistan.  
This research serves as an important first step in understanding the factors that 
have affected FDI inflows to Pakistan, and across sectors within the country. This paper 
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has demonstrated that ineffective governance and declining national security contribute to 
a reduction in inflows of FDI to Pakistan. In coming years, the Pakistani government’s 
capacity in encouraging and maintain FDI growth will be crucial to the development of 
the domestic economy. The government will need to closely consider the types of FDI 
inflows being drawn to the country, and carefully assess how inflows affect domestic 
communities.180 The pursuit of socio-economic advancement in Pakistan must be a 
collaborative effort between the public and private sectors. The role of the Pakistani 
government in developing, maintaining and facilitating this collaboration is going to 
continue to be crucial. 
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